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One of a rms most important decisions is how to raise capital. Most research focuses
on the choice between debt and equity. For example, the pecking-order theory of Myers and
Majluf (1984, MM) posits that managers issue securities with least information asymme-
try, while the market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggests that managers sell
securities that are most overvalued. However, another major source of nancing is relatively
unexplored: selling non-core assets, such as divisions or physical capital. Asset sales are
substantial in practice: Securities Data Corporation (SDC) records $131bn of asset sales
by non-nancial rms in the U.S. in 2012, versus $81bn in seasoned equity issuance. Eckbo
and Kisser (2014) nd that illiquid asset sales are as large as the combined proceeds of
equity and debt issuance; they argue that the prominence of illiquid asset sales challenges
the traditional nancing pecking order.
While some asset sales may be motivated by operational reasons, nancing is a key driver
of many others. Asset sales are used to fund investment and R&D (shown by Hovakimian
and Titman (2006) and Borisova and Brown (2013) respectively), to recapitalize in response
to regulatory or investor concerns (as with many banks after the nancial crisis), and
to address one-time cash needs (BP targeted $45bn in asset sales to cover the costs of
Deepwater Horizon). More generally, Borisova, John, and Salotti (2013) nd that over half
of asset sellers state nancing motives. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) report that
70% of nancially constrained rms increased asset sales in the nancial crisis, versus 37% of
unconstrained rms. In all of these cases, the rm could have presumably met its nancing
needs by issuing securities, but instead chose to sell assets. Indeed, Hite, Owers, and Rogers
(1987) examine the stated motives for asset sales and note that in several cases ... selling
assets was viewed as an alternative to the sale of new securities.
This papers goal is to analyze the factors that determine whether rms raise capital
through selling assets rather than issuing securities. It may seem that asset sales can already
be analyzed by extending the MM intuition from security issuance to asset sales, removing
the need for a new theory. Such an extension would suggest that selling non-core assets is
preferred if and only if they exhibit less information asymmetry than the rms total assets,
which underlie rm-level securities such as debt and equity. While information asymmetry
about assets-in-place remains important, there are two critical di¤erences between assets
and securities which mean that asset sales cannot be studied within the MM framework.
First, a purchaser of non-core assets obtains a claim to the assets alone, whereas a purchaser
of securities owns a claim to the rms entire balance sheet. Second, the sale of non-core
assets but not securities may be motivated by dissynergies rather than private informa-
tion. These two di¤erences in turn lead to three new forces that drive the choice between
asset sales and security issuance, that may outweigh information asymmetry concerns and
are the core contribution of the paper. In turn, the strength of these forces depends on
various factors, such as the amount of nancing required, the use of proceeds, the range of
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potential synergies, the correlation structure of the rms assets, and the managers stock
price concerns, thus giving rise to a rich set of empirical predictions.
We analyze a rm that comprises a core asset and a non-core asset, and has a nancing
need that it can meet by either selling part of the non-core asset, or issuing a security against
its balance sheet. For simplicity this security is equity, but Appendix B shows that the same
insights apply to debt. The rms type is privately known to its manager and comprises two
dimensions. The rst is quality, which determines the assetsstandalone (common) values.
Firms with high-quality core assets may have either high- or low-quality non-core assets.
We analyze both possibilities, labeling them the positive- and negative-correlation cases, re-
spectively. The second dimension is synergy, which captures the additional (private) value
lost when the non-core asset is separated from its current owner. Thus, our model allows
rms to sell assets not only for nancing reasons, but also for operational reasons (dissyn-
ergies). The model is tractable even allowing for two dimensions of private information
(quality and synergy), which typically makes a signaling model di¢ cult to solve.
The rst of our three new forces is the balance sheet e¤ect, which represents an advantage
to selling equity, and its strength depends on the amount of nancing required and the
use of proceeds. It stems solely from the rst di¤erence between assets and equity. New
shareholders obtain a stake in the rms entire balance sheet, which includes not only the
core and non-core assets in place (whose values are unknown), but also the funds raised.
Since the value of the funds raised is known, this mitigates the information asymmetry of
assets in place. In contrast, asset purchasers obtain a claim to the asset alone, and not the
entire balance sheet and thus the funds raised. As a result, even if the non-core asset exhibits
less information asymmetry than the rms total assets and so the MM intuition would
suggest that rms sell non-core assets equity may exhibit less information asymmetry, and
thus be preferred, if enough funds are raised that the balance sheet e¤ect dominates.
Thus, the source of nancing depends on the amount required: larger (smaller) amounts
encourage the sale of equity (assets). This contrasts standard nancing models, in which the
choice of nancing depends only on the characteristics of each claim (such as its information
asymmetry (MM) or misvaluation (Baker and Wurgler 2002) and not the amount required
unless one assumes exogenous limits such as debt capacity. The balance sheet e¤ect does
not appear in MM, since all claims (debt and equity) are on the balance sheet.
The initial analysis considers any use of funds whose expected value is uncorrelated with
rm quality, e.g. replenishing capital, repaying debt, or paying suppliers. We also allow the
funds to nance an investment whose expected return is correlated with rm quality, and
thus exhibits information asymmetry. One might expect the balance sheet e¤ect to weaken,
since risky investment makes the balance sheet (and thus equity) riskier. However, there
is a second e¤ect: since investment is positive-NPV, the certain (i.e. quality-independent)
component of the value of the injected funds rises. If the minimum investment return
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(earned by the low-quality rm) is large compared to the additional return earned by the
high-quality rm, this second e¤ect dominates and the balance sheet e¤ect strengthens.
Thus, equity is more common when growth opportunities are good for rms of all quality
(e.g. in booms): the source of nancing depends on the use of proceeds. If the additional
return earned by the high-quality rm is large, the rst e¤ect dominates and the balance
sheet e¤ect weakens. However, it almost always remains positive: asset (equity) sales
continue to be used for low (high) nancing needs.
The second new force is the correlation e¤ect, which represents an advantage to selling
assets, and its strength depends on the correlation structure of the rms balance sheet and
the managers stock price concerns (which are absent in MM). It also stems solely from the
rst di¤erence between assets and securities the purchaser of assets acquires a claim to
assets alone, and not the rm, and so the value of this claim need not be positively correlated
with the rm. An equity issuer su¤ers an Akerlof (1970) lemonsdiscount on not only the
equity issued, but also the rest of the rm because the two are perfectly correlated equity
is a claim on the rm, and is in fact a carbon copy of it. Thus, its stock price falls. An asset
seller similarly receives a low price on the assets sold, but not necessarily the rm, since it is
not a carbon copy. For example, companies often shed their original lines of business after
they have become non-core.1 Non-core business lines are not necessarily safer than the rest
of the rm, but may have low correlation while their sale is a negative signal about the
divested assets, it may be a positive signal about the retained ones. The magnitude of this
advantage is increasing in the managers stock price concerns. Note that the correlation
e¤ect does not require the core and non-core asset to be negatively correlated; it can exist
even if the correlation is strictly positive. The crux is that equity has a correlation of 1
with the rm, so a low price for equity issued automatically implies a low price for the rest
of the rm. However, a non-core asset may have a correlation of less than 1, even if the
correlation is still positive, since it is not a claim on the rms balance sheet.
An implication of the correlation e¤ect is that conglomerates issue equity less often, and
sell assets more often, than rms with closely related divisions, since they are more likely
to have lowly-correlated assets. It also gives rise to a novel benet of diversication: a
non-core asset is a form of nancial slack. While the literature on investment reversibility
(e.g., Abel and Eberly 1996) models reversibility as a feature of the assets technology, here
an investment that is not a carbon copy of the rm is reversible in that it can be sold
without negative inferences on the stock price.
The third new force is the camouage e¤ect, which also represents an advantage to
selling assets, and its strength depends on the rms actual level of synergy and the range of
potential synergies in the economy. It stems solely from the second di¤erence between assets
1Examples include the sale of Interlakes steel business in favor of its aerospace business, GEs appliance
and nance businesses in favor of its industrials business, and Pearsons Financial Times and its stake in
The Economist in favor of its education business. See Feldman (2014) for a systematic study.
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and securities that the sale of the former may be motivated by dissynergies. Conglomerates
often shed non-core assets stating a desire to refocus on the core business, but outsiders do
not know if the true motivation is that the non-core assets were low-quality. (The balance
sheet and correlation e¤ects do not require synergies, but they are robust to the inclusion
of synergies). The e¤ect arises if rms have the option not to raise nancing and instead
to forgo a growth opportunity. If the growth opportunity is weak, it is outweighed by the
losses that high-quality rms would su¤er from issuing equity, and so they will not issue
equity. However, high-quality rms will sell assets if they are su¢ ciently dissynergistic, not
so much to nance growth but to get rid of dissynergies. Asset sales by high-quality rms
allow low-quality rms to pool: they can camouage an asset sale driven by overvaluation
(the asset is low-quality and has a low common value) as instead being driven by operational
reasons (it is dissynergistic and only has a low private value).
Note that any non-informational motive allows a seller to camouagean overvalued
claim. For example, in MM, rms can issue overvalued equity and claim that it is to -
nance investment. However, this motive can be used to disguise both asset sales and equity
issuance, and so does not a¤ect the choice between them. We use the term camouage
e¤ectto refer not to general non-informational motives (which arise in other models and
apply to both assets and equity), but specically to the camouage provided by dissynergy
motives, which apply only to asset sales and is unique to this paper. When growth oppor-
tunities are strong, high-quality rms sell both assets and equity to nance growth; since
both nancing channels o¤er camouage,low-quality rms have no clear preference for
either. When growth opportunities are weak, the only non-informational motive to issue
claims is dissynergies. This motive exists only for assets and not equity, and so only assets
provide camouage. Thus, low-quality rms strictly prefer asset sales: indeed, they will sell
assets even if they are synergistic.
While our model explicitly studies selling equity versus assets, it can be interpreted
more broadly as studying at what level to issue claims: the rm level (equity issuance) or
the asset level (asset sales). Our e¤ects also apply to other types of claim that the rm
can issue at each level.2 All three e¤ects apply to parent-company risky debt (or general
securities issued against the rms balance sheet, as analyzed by DeMarzo and Du¢ e 1999)
in the same way as parent-company equity: since parent-company debt is also a claim to
the entire rm, it benets from the balance sheet e¤ect but not the correlation e¤ect (debt
is positively correlated with rm value) nor the camouage e¤ect (issuing debt cannot be
camouaged by the desire to remove dissynergies). We analyze debt explicitly in Appendix
B. Since our focus is on the level of claim rather than the type of claim, we study the
2The securitization literature (e.g. DeMarzo and Du¢ e 1999, DeMarzo 2005) studies the type of claim
that a rm should issue, in contrast to our focus on the level of claim. In DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999), all
claims are against the rms balance sheet. In DeMarzo (2005), all claims are at the asset level. Even if a
claim is securitized against multiple assets, it is backed only by those assets and not by the funds injected,
so there is no balance sheet e¤ect.
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rms choice between standard claims (assets, equity, and, in an extension, debt) rather
than taking general security design approach. This allows us rst to focus on the core
contribution of the paper, and second to simplify the model, in turn enabling us to solve a
two-dimensional adverse selection problem in a tractable manner.
Existing theories of asset sales generally consider asset sales as the only source of nanc-
ing and do not compare them to equity, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Eisfeldt (2004),
DeMarzo (2005), He (2009), and Kurlat (2013). In Milbradt (2012) and Bond and Leitner
(2015), the rm only owns one type of asset and so there is no distinction between selling
assets and equity. A partial asset sale a¤ects the mark-to-market price of the sellers re-
maining portfolio, similar to our correlation e¤ect. Here, the rm has other (core) assets in
addition to the ones under consideration for sale. Thus, we show that the correlation e¤ect
is stronger for equity: while a partial asset sale implies a negative valuation of the remaining
unsold non-core assets, it need not imply a negative valuation of the core assets and thus
the rm. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) also consider both asset sales and equity issuance
under information asymmetry, but do not feature the balance sheet, correlation, or camou-
age e¤ects. In their model, information asymmetry only exists under negative correlation,
and there is no correlation e¤ect because the manager has no stock price concerns. Arnold,
Hackbarth, and Puhan (2017) study the choice between asset sales and equity issuance to
overcome debt overhang, rather than information asymmetry and the pecking order.3
While we show that the MM pecking order intuition cannot be naturally extended to
the choice between asset sales and equity, Nachman and Noe (1994) show that the original
pecking order (between debt and equity) only holds under special conditions. Fulghieri,
Garcia, and Hackbarth (2016) demonstrate that these conditions are particularly likely to
be violated for younger rms with larger investment needs and riskier growth opportunities,
where equity is indeed preferred to debt empirically.
In addition to the applied implications for asset sales, our paper makes a theoretical
contribution by solving a multi-dimensional information asymmetry problem in a tractable
manner. We avoid the considerable technical di¢ culties that typically arise in models of
multi-dimensional information asymmetry, as discussed in Kreps and Sobel (1994), Arm-
strong and Rochet (1999), and Rochet and Stole (2003), because the expected value of
the asset to the uninformed party depends only on quality and not synergy, even though
both dimensions a¤ect the value of the asset sale to the informed party. Guerrieri and
Shimer (2015), Williams (2016), and Chang (2017) similarly study multi-dimensional sig-
naling models in which one dimension of private information only a¤ects the sellers private
value. This dimension is the sellers impatience, which always leads him to wish to sell the
3Empirically, Jain (1985), Klein (1986), Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987), Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro
(1995), and Feldman (2014) nd positive market reactions to asset sales. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995)
show that this positive reaction stems from nancing rather than operational reasons. Brown, James, and
Mooradian (1994) and Bates (2006) examine the use of proceeds. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) analyze operational rather than nancing motives.
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asset, whereas synergy in our model can be positive or negative. The applications of the
models are quite di¤erent: the above papers consider a single asset and a search framework,
where trade happens probabilistically and the probability of trading is a key dimension on
which di¤erent types can separate. Our model studies multiple assets and the choice is on
the type of claim rather than probability of sale. To our knowledge, ours is the rst model
to solve a signaling problem with multi-dimensional information asymmetry where trade
happens with certainty. Such a framework is applicable to settings in which the seller must
satisfy a liquidity need, although it can also apply to the case of voluntary capital raising.
1 Baseline Model
The model consists of two types of risk-neutral agent: rms, which raise nancing, and
investors, who provide nancing and set prices. The rm is run by a manager, who has
private information about the rms quality q 2 fH;Lg, which measures the standalone
(common) value of its assets. The prior probability that q = H is  2 (0; 1). In Section 2
we will introduce a second dimension to rm type, synergy, which measures the (positive
or negative) additional private value of the asset.
The rm comprises two assets or lines of business. The core business has value Cq, where
CH > CL, and the non-core business has value Aq. Where there is no ambiguity, we use
the term assets to refer to the non-core business. We consider two specications of the
model. If AH > (<)AL, the two assets are positively (negatively) correlated. (If AH = AL,
the non-core asset exhibits no information asymmetry and so it is automatic that rms will
raise nancing by selling it.) In both cases, we assume:
CH +AH > CL +AL, (1)
soH has a higher total value even if AH < AL. The distinction between AH > AL and AH <
AL reects that it is not only the information asymmetry of the non-core asset that matters
(jAH  ALj), as in MM, but also its correlation with the core asset (sign (AH  AL)).4
We consider an individual rm that raises nancing of F . In Section 1, the rm is forced
to raise nancing (e.g. to meet an exogenous liquidity need), and the funds raised increase
expected rm value by F . This treatment incorporates many capital raising motives, such
as retaining cash to replenish capital or for precautionary reasons; repaying debtholders or
suppliers; or meeting one-time cash needs such as litigation expenses.5 Section 2 gives rms
4He (2009) considers a di¤erent multiple-asset setting where the value of each asset comprises a com-
ponent known to the seller, and an unknown component. The (known) correlation refers to the correlation
between the unknown components; here it refers to the correlation between the total values of the assets
(which are known to the seller). His model considers asset sales but not equity issuance.
5Consistent with the rst motive, Kim and Weisbach (2008) and McLean (2011) nd that stockpiling
cash for precautionary motives is the largest use of seasoned equity issues. Consistent with the second and
third motives, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) nd that a near-term cash need is the primary motive
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the choice of whether to raise nancing, and also allows the cash to be used to nance an
investment whose return is correlated with q and thus exhibits information asymmetry.
The rm can raise F by selling either non-core assets or equity; partial asset sales are
possible. Formally, it issues a claim X 2 fE;Ag, where E represents equity and A assets.
Investors are perfectly competitive and price both the claim being sold and the rms stock
at their expected values conditional upon X. The rm cannot sell the core asset as it is
essential to the rm; Appendix D relaxes this assumption.
Appendix B allows the rm to issue risky debt and shows that the same balance sheet,
correlation, and camouage e¤ects apply to risky debt as well as equity. Since the analysis
of risky debt requires us to complicate the model by introducing risk, we do not include
it in the core model (as in MM). Instead, when the core model delivers each of the three
e¤ects for equity, we discuss the intuition for why they also apply to debt.
Firms cannot raise nancing in excess of F ; this assumption can be justied by forces
outside the model such as agency costs of free cash ow. Firms use a single source of
nancing; Appendix E shows that the equilibria continue to hold when rms are allowed
to use a combination of both sources. We specify F  min (AL; AH), so that asset sales
are feasible for any F ; this ensures that there is no mechanical link between the amount of
nancing required and the source of nancing. We abstract from di¤erences between asset
sales and equity issuance due to frictions such as taxes, transactions costs, liquidity, and
bargaining power, because they will have obvious e¤ects: the rm will lean towards the
nancing source that exhibits the weakest frictions.
The nancing choice a¤ects the rms fundamental value, because it will enjoy a capital
gain (loss) if the claim is overvalued (undervalued). It will also a¤ect the rms stock price
as the market will infer rm quality from the choice of claim issued. The manager places
weight ! on the rms stock price and 1   ! on its fundamental value.6 These concerns
are common in the signaling literature and can stem from a number of sources. Examples
include takeover threat (Stein 1988), reputational concerns (Narayanan 1985, Scharfstein
and Stein 1990), the manager maximizing value on behalf of shareholders who may sell
before fundamental value is realized (Miller and Rock 1985), or the manager expecting to
sell his own shares before fundamental value is realized (Stein 1989).7
We solve for pure strategy equilibria.8 We use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium solution
for seasoned equity issues, and that the majority of issuers would have run out of cash without the issue;
the introduction cites several papers showing that cash needs motivate asset sales.
6The stock price is the rms expected value based on public information, while fundamental value is
based on the managers private information. Both are calculated from the perspective of existing shareholders
and are thus net of nancing costs (e.g. claims given to new shareholders).
7Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2014), Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2017), and Edmans,
Goncalves-Pinto, Groen-Xu, and Wang (2017) show that managers typically have signicant equity vesting
in the short-term.
8Mixed strategy equilibria only exist for the type that is exactly indi¤erent between the two claims.
Since synergies are continuous, this type is atomistic and so it does not matter for posterior beliefs whether
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concept, where: (i) Investors have a belief about which rm types issue which claim X; (ii)
The price of the claim being issued equals its expected value, conditional on investorsbeliefs
in (i); (iii) Each manager issues the claim X that maximizes his objective function, given
investors beliefs; (iv) Investors beliefs satisfy Bayes rule; (v) Beliefs on o¤-equilibrium
actions are consistent with the D1 renement of Banks and Sobel (1987) and Cho and
Kreps (1987). For an o¤-equilibrium action, D1 precludes putting any weight on a type for
which the set of beliefs that would induce deviation to that action are a strict subset of
that for a di¤erent type. Specically, if the set of prices for claim X that would induce L to
deviate to X are a strict subset of that which would induce H to deviate loosely speaking,
if L is less willingto deviate than H then the o¤-equilibrium belief that a deviator to
claim X is of type L is ruled out. We use the D1 renement as it is typically used in other
security issuance models, such as Boot and Thakor (1993), Nachman and Noe (1994), and
DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999), and thus maximizes comparability with prior literature. An
earlier version of the paper used the weaker Intuitive Criterion equilibrium renement; all
results were similar, although the expressions were somewhat more complex.9
We rst analyze the positive correlation version of the model (AH > AL) and then move
to negative correlation (AL > AH).
1.1 Positive Correlation
This section demonstrates the balance sheet e¤ect, an advantage of issuing equity. It stems
from the rst di¤erence between assets and securities assets are not a claim to the rms
entire balance sheet, and thus do not share in the new funds raised whose value is certain.
For ease of exposition, we set ! = 0 in the positive correlation model, so that the manager
maximizes fundamental value. There is a nontrivial role for ! > 0 only under negative
correlation, in which case there is a trade-o¤ in being inferred as L: market valuation falls,
but the rm receives a high price if it sells assets. With positive correlation, there is no
such trade-o¤: being inferred as L worsens both market and fundamental values. Allowing
for ! > 0 adds additional terms to the equilibrium conditions, without a¤ecting the set of
sustainable equilibria or their properties.
The equilibria are given in Proposition 1 below. We dene Eq  Cq + Aq + F as the
equity value of a rm of type q, and F   CHAL CLAHAH AL . (All proofs are in Appendix A.)
Proposition 1. (Positive correlation, pooling equilibria):
we specify this cuto¤ type as mixing or playing a pure strategy.
9For example, a pooling equilibrium requires three conditions: one to ensure that H does not deviate,
one to ensure that L does not deviate, and one to ensure that the o¤-equilibrium belief is reasonable. The
second is typically trivial. Under D1, the third condition is so strong that it automatically implies the rst,
and so the equilibrium only requires one condition. Under the Intuitive Criterion, the third condition neither
implies nor is implied by the rst, so we need to characterize the equilibria with two separate conditions.
However, the results remain the same intuitively, since D1 is a strong renement, all equilibria will continue
to hold under weaker renements such as the Intuitive Criterion.
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(i) An asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if and only if F  F . In this equilibrium,
all rms sell assets for E [A] = AH + (1   )AL. If equity is sold (o¤-equilibrium), it is
inferred as type L and valued at EL.
(ii) An equity-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if and only if F  F . In this equilib-
rium, all rms sell equity for E [E] = EH +(1 )EL. If assets are sold (o¤-equilibrium),
they are inferred as type L and valued at AL.
We rst discuss the asset-pooling equilibrium. This equilibrium requires three condi-
tions: L does not wish to deviate; H does not wish to deviate; and the o¤-equilibrium belief
that a deviator is of type L satises D1.
We start by analyzing the rst requirement. L enjoys a capital gain of F (AH AL)E[A] by
selling low-quality assets (worth AL) at a pooled price (of E [A]). If L deviates to equity, its
capital gain is zero since low-quality equity (worth EL) is sold for EL. Thus, L automatically
does not want to deviate.
The second and third requirements are satised by the condition F  F . This condition
can be rewritten
AH
AL
 CH +AH + F
CL +AL + F
. (2)
The left-hand-side (LHS) is the ratio of high- to low-quality asset values, and the
right-hand-side (RHS) is the ratio of high- to low-quality equity values. Thus, F  F 
implies that the information asymmetry of assets is less than that of equity. Crucially,
F appears only in the equity term on the RHS, but not the assets term on the LHS. An
equity investor has a claim to the rms entire balance sheet, which contains the funds
raised F . Since F is known, this balance sheet e¤ect mitigates the information asymmetry
of equity. In contrast, an asset purchaser owns a claim to the asset alone, and so bears the
full information asymmetry associated with its value. As F rises, the RHS of (2) becomes
dominated by the term F (which is the same in the numerator and the denominator as it is
known) and less dominated by the unknown assets-in-place terms Cq and Aq (which di¤er
between the numerator and denominator). Thus, the information asymmetry of equity on
the RHS falls towards 1, and the inequality is harder to satisfy. Note that, even if non-core
assets exhibit less information asymmetry than total assets in place (AHAL <
CH+AH
CL+AL
), they
may still exhibit more information asymmetry than equity if F is large enough. Contrary
to the MM intuition, equity is not always the riskiest claim.
In short, assets have less information than equity if and only if the balance sheet is
weak, i.e. F  F . In turn, F  F  plays two roles. First, it ensures that H does not
wish to deviate (the second requirement of the equilibrium). In equilibrium, H su¤ers a
capital loss on asset sales, and would su¤er a capital loss by deviating to equity. If F  F ,
the information equity of assets, and the thus the capital loss from asset sales, is lower.
Second, F  F  ensures that the o¤-equilibrium belief, that a deviator to equity is of type
L, satises D1 (the third requirement of the equilibrium). Loosely speaking, D1 requires L
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to be more willing to deviate to equity than H. H prefers claims with low information
asymmetry as it su¤ers a smaller capital loss, and L prefers high information asymmetry. If
F  F , the balance sheet e¤ect is su¢ ciently small that equity exhibits higher information
asymmetry than assets, and so L is indeed more willingto sell it than H. Thus, the two
non-trivial requirements normally needed for a pooling equilibrium reduce to only one.
The intuition for the equity-pooling equilibrium is the same. Condition F  F  implies
that assets have more information asymmetry than equity. Thus, H will not deviate to
assets, as the capital loss would be higher; it also means that the o¤-equilibrium belief, that
a deviator to asset sales is of type L, satises D1.
Overall, Proposition 1 shows that a pooling equilibrium always exists and is unique.
There can be no separating equilibrium since one claim would be associated with L, and so
the rm selling it would have an incentive to pool with H. The claim sold in the pooling
equilibrium depends on the amount of nancing required. When it increases, the balance
sheet e¤ect strengthens, and rms switch from selling assets to equity. Thus, the type of
claim issued depends not only on its inherent characteristics (information asymmetry) but
also the amount of nancing required. In standard theories, the type of security issued only
depends on its characteristics (e.g., information asymmetry or overvaluation), unless one
assumes exogenous restrictions on nancing such as limited debt capacity. Here, F can be
fully raised from either source.
To put numbers on this result, if CH = $100m, CL = $85m, AH = $80m, and
AL = $70m, then F  = $20m: equity exhibits less information asymmetry than asset
sales whenever the nancing need is greater than $20m. Note that F refers to the amount
of nancing required relative to the size of the existing assets in place. If the values CH ,
CL, AH , and AL all doubled, then the threshold F   CHAL CLAHAH AL would also double.
It may seem that, since nancing is a motive for asset sales, greater nancing needs
should lead to more asset sales. This result is delivered by investment models where nancial
constraints induce disinvestment. Here, if F rises su¢ ciently, the rm may sell fewer assets,
since it substitutes into an alternative source of nancing: equity. The amount of capital
required therefore a¤ects rm boundaries. If we introduce synergies and allow for the
average synergy to be positive, then asset sales reduce total surplus compared to equity
issuance. Surprisingly, greater nancial constraints may improve real e¢ ciency as rms
retain their synergistic assets and issue equity instead.
We close this section by discussing additional extensions and applications.
Risky Debt. As shown in Appendix B, the balance sheet e¤ect applies equally to risky
debt, since debt like equity but unlike assets is also a claim on the rms balance sheet
and thus shares in the new funds raised. Thus, risky debt will also exhibit less information
asymmetry and is preferred to assets if and only if F is large. (Naturally, if F is so low
that debt becomes risk-free, it is also preferred.)
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Single-Segment Firm. A single-segment rm corresponds to Cq = Aq: core and non-core
assets are one and the same. Then, F  = 0 and so asset-pooling is never sustainable for
any F . Intuitively, since the information asymmetry of the rm equals that of the non-core
asset, the balance sheet e¤ect reduces the information asymmetry of equity lower.
Selling the Core Asset. Appendix D shows that the balance sheet e¤ect is robust to
allowing rms to also sell the core asset. The intuition is as follows. One of the assets
(core or non-core) will exhibit greater information asymmetry; since equity is a mix of both
assets, its information asymmetry will lie in between and so it is never the safest claim.
Indeed, DeMarzos (2005) information destruction e¤ectmight suggest that equity would
never be issued: pooling assets together destroys the sellers option to sell one asset in
particular. However, it may still be issued due to the balance sheet e¤ect: equity-pooling
can be sustained.
1.2 Negative Correlation
We now turn to the case of negative correlation, i.e., AL > AH . This section demonstrates
the correlation e¤ect, an advantage of selling assets. This e¤ect stems from the rst di¤er-
ence between assets and securities assets are not a claim to the rms entire balance sheet
and so are not a carbon copy. Thus, even if the market infers that an asset being sold is
low-quality, this need not imply that the rm as a whole is low-quality.
Since AL > AH , we now use the term high (low)-quality non-core assets to refer to
the non-core assets of L (H). Note that negative correlation only means that high-quality
rms are not universally high-quality, as they may have low-quality non-core assets. It does
not require the values of the divisions to covary negatively with each other over time (e.g.,
that a market upswing helps one division and hurts the other). The market may know
the correlation of the asset with the core business (even if it does not observe quality) by
observing the type of asset traded. For example, the value of Interlakes steel business is
likely negatively correlated with its aerospace business as a high steel price is good (bad)
news for the former (latter).10 As we will see, the correlation e¤ect does not require that
the correlation between the core and non-core assets be perfectly negative, only that it is
not perfectly positive.
We return to the case of general stock price concerns ! > 0 because, with negative
correlation, there is now a trade-o¤ involved in selling assets: being inferred as L reduces
the rms stock price but increases proceeds and thus fundamental value. Without stock
10Note that the correlation e¤ect requires (the possibility of) negative correlation not between core and
non-core assetstotal cash ows, but between the component of their cash ows that is private information.
Using the earlier example of Interlake, if private information is on the outlook for the steel price (which
increases cash ows for its steel business but reduces them for its aerospace business), the correlation e¤ect
applies. However, if private information is on the quality of Interlakes corporate culture, which is likely
positively correlated with the value of both businesses, it does not.
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price concerns, rms would trivially sell their worst-quality claim (H sells its low-quality
assets, and L sells a claim on its low-quality core assets by issuing equity), and so no pooling
equilibrium is sustainable (see Appendix C.1). In MM, the rm only has a single class of
assets, which are therefore perfectly positively correlated with each other. Thus, a low price
for the claim issued automatically implies a low valuation for the rest of the rm, and so
there is no loss of generality in setting ! = 0 (just as in Section 1.1). This section generalizes
MM by allowing for negative correlation, which can lead to the markets inference of the
claim sold di¤ering from that of the rest of the rm. This in turn has non-trivial implications
if the manager is concerned with both stock price and fundamental value.
Proposition 2 below states that an equity-pooling equilibrium is never sustainable under
negative correlation, but an asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if stock price concerns
! are su¢ ciently high.
Proposition 2. (Negative correlation, pooling equilibria.) An equity-pooling equilibrium is
never sustainable. An asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if and only if
!  !APE 
F

AL
E[A]   1

((CH   CL)  (AL  AH)) + F

AL
E[A]   1
 : (3)
In this equilibrium, all rms sell assets for E [A] = AH + (1   )AL. If equity is sold
(o¤-equilibrium), it is inferred as type L and valued at EL. The stock prices of asset sellers
and equity issuers are E [C +A] and CL +AL, respectively.
We start by discussing the asset-pooling equilibrium. Unlike in the positive correlation
section, it is now L (H) that makes a capital loss (gain). Since L also has lower-quality
equity, L is more willing to deviate to equity than H, and so the only admissible o¤-
equilibrium belief is that a deviator to equity is of type L. Under this belief, it is automatic
that H will not deviate. We now consider Ls incentive to deviate. Under asset-pooling, L
su¤ers a capital loss, but enjoys a pooled stock price. If it deviates to equity, L breaks even
as its low-quality equity (worth EL) is sold for a low price (of EL). However, the low price
applies not only to the equity sold, but also the rest of the rm, as it is a carbon copy. The
manager will thus not deviate if stock price concerns are su¢ ciently high (!  !APE), even
though deviation would avoid a capital loss.
We now turn to the equity-pooling equilibrium. As in the positive correlation section,
H (L) makes a capital loss (gain). Since H also has lower-quality assets than L, H is more
willing to deviate, and so the only admissible o¤-equilibrium belief is that a deviator to
asset sales is of type H. We now consider Hs incentive to deviate under this belief. If H
deviates to assets, it would receive a (fair) low price of AH and break even compared to its
current capital loss. However, this low price applies only to the asset being sold and not
the rest of the rm, as it is not a carbon copy. Instead, deviation leads to a high stock price
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which, coupled with the avoidance of a capital loss, induces H to deviate and so equity-
pooling is unsustainable for any !. Under deviation, Hs assets are correctly assessed as
lemonsand lowly-priced. Thus, the market-timing motive for nancing (e.g., Baker and
Wurgler 2002) does not exist yet deviation is still protable as it yields a high stock price.
In sum, a pooling equilibrium where all rms sell assets is sustainable, but one where
all rms issue equity is not. This preference for asset sales stems from the correlation e¤ect,
which arises from two sources. First, equity is perfectly correlated with the rest of the rm,
but the asset need not be. A low price is attached to any claim sold, but only if this claim
is equity is the low price also attached to the rest of the rm. Second, the manager places
su¢ cient weight on how nancing decisions a¤ect the markets inference over rm value,
reected in the stock price (!  !APE), The correlation e¤ect shows that it is not only an
assets information asymmetry that matters (as in MM) but also its correlation with the
rm. Even if an asset exhibits high information asymmetry and thus su¤ers a high lemons
discount, its sale could still be attractive, if it does not imply that the rm is low-quality.
The preference for asset sales points to a novel benet of diversication. Stein (1997)
notes that an advantage of holding assets that are not perfectly correlated is winner-
picking: a conglomerate can increase investment in the division with the best investment
opportunities at the time. Our model suggests that another advantage is loser-picking:
a rm can raise capital by selling a low-quality asset, without implying a low value for the
rest of the rm. Thus, diversication into unrelated sectors provides greater nancial slack
than expanding in ones core business. Relatedly, the analysis points to a new notion of
investment reversibility. Standard theories (e.g., Abel and Eberly 1996) model reversibility
as the real value that can be salvaged by undoing an investment, which in turn depends on
the assets technology. Here, reversibility depends on the markets inference of rm type if
an investment is sold, and thus the correlation between the asset and the rest of the rm.
In addition to the asset-pooling equilibrium, a separating equilibrium may also be sus-
tainable, where H sells its low-quality non-core assets and L sells its low-quality equity.
Since this equilibrium yields the unsurprising result that each rms sells its low-quality
claim, we defer it to Appendix C.1.
We close this section by discussing additional extensions and applications.
Risky Debt. Appendix B shows that the correlation e¤ect also applies to risky debt since,
like equity, it is positively correlated with rm value. The issuance of debt may imply that
debt is low-quality, and so the rm is also low-quality.
Selling the Core Asset. Appendix D considers the case when the rm can sell the core
asset. Since the core (non-core) asset is positively (negatively) correlated with rm value,
this extension allows the rm to choose the correlation of the asset it sells, whereas the
analysis thus far has considered either positive or negative correlation. A pooling equilibrium
in which all rms sell the non-core asset can be sustained, but neither one in which all rms
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sell equity, nor one in which all rms sell the core asset, is feasible. This is because the
non-core asset is negatively correlated with rm value, whereas equity and the core asset
are both positively correlated. Thus, the correlation e¤ect continues to apply when rms
can choose the correlation of the assets they sell.
General Correlations. A two-type model, while tractable, implies that correlations are
either perfectly positive (if AH > AL) or perfectly negative (if AH < AL). Appendix F
studies a more general model that allows for any degree of correlation between the core and
non-core assets (which nests Sections 1.1 and 1.2 as special cases). The correlation e¤ect
continues to hold as long as the correlation is su¢ ciently low (indeed, it can even be strictly
positive): asset-pooling is sustainable if ! is su¢ ciently high, but equity-pooling cannot be
sustained for any !.
The intuition is the same as above. Regardless of the correlation between core and
non-core assets, the correlation between the equity being sold and the rest of the rm will
always be 1. Thus, deviation to equity issuance from asset-pooling always leads to a low
price for both the equity being issued and the rest of the rm. In contrast, even with a
positive correlation, non-core assets are not a carbon copy of the rest of the rm, and so a
negative signal on the former can be a positive signal on the latter.
2 General Model
This section gives rms the choice of whether to raise capital, allows the capital raised to
nance a positive-NPV investment, and introduces synergies. These extensions naturally
go together since, if given the choice not to raise capital, H would never sell assets unless
they are dissynergistic, nor issue equity unless the capital raised could be used productively.
Now, in addition to quality q, each rm has a second type dimension: synergy k, which
is uncorrelated with q. The cumulative distribution function is given by G (k), which is
di¤erentiable and bounded below and above by k and k, where  1 < k  0, k > 0. Synergy
k measures the additional (private) value lost if the current owner sells the asset.11 If a
rm sells a non-core asset with a true value of $1, its fundamental value falls by $1 + k.12
Thus, k > (<) 0 represents synergies (dissynergies), where the asset is worth more (less) to
the current owner than a potential purchaser, even absent information asymmetry. That
11The results continue to hold when using a discrete synergy distribution (to match our discrete quality
distribution). However, the analysis becomes signicantly more cumbersome. While quality naturally has
two outcomes (high and low), synergy would have to have at least three outcomes (negative, zero, and
positive), with zero synergies necessary to nest the MM case and also match reality. Thus, we would have
six rm types, making the equilibria much more complex to characterize.
12Synergies k thus do not appear under the current balance sheet, but instead a¤ect the fundamental
value lost if assets are sold. We have also solved the model where synergies explicitly appear on the rms
balance sheet before nancing is raised, i.e. the rms current equity value is Cq+Aq (1 + k). The economic
forces remain robust but the exposition is more cumbersome because the privately-known synergy k now
appears in the equity claim and thus requires additional inference by investors.
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k  0 allows for asset sales to be motivated by operational reasons (dissynergies) rather
than only nancing reasons.13 In addition to synergies, k > 0 can also arise if investment
in assets is costly to reverse (e.g. Abel and Eberly 1996). The expected value of the claim
to investors depends only on how they infer quality q from X, and not synergy k, which
allows us to incorporate two dimensions of private information while retaining tractability.
We sometimes use the term Hor H-rmto refer to a high-quality rm regardless of
its synergy parameter, and similarly Lor L-rm.
The action space is now richer. All rms can either do nothing, or instead raise capital of
F to nance an investment with expected value Rq = F (1 + rq), where rH  0 and rL  0:
since the rm can always hold cash, it will only undertake positive-NPV investments. We
thus now have Eq = Cq + Aq + F (1 + rq). We allow for both rH  rL and rH < rL
(while continuing to assume EH > EL). Note that rq captures the expected return on the
investment; the model does not require investment to lead to a return of rq with certainty.
Thus, it accommodates general distributions for the investment return; given risk-neutrality,
only the expected return matters.
In the following sections, we analyze the case of positive correlation and demonstrate two
main results. First, Section 2.1 analyzes the conditions under which the pooling equilibria
of Section 1.1 continue to be sustainable. It shows that the balance sheet e¤ect continues
to hold, and can even strengthen, when there is information asymmetry over the use of the
cash raised. Second, Section 2.2 shows that new semi-separating equilibria may now be
sustainable which demonstrate the camouage e¤ect, an advantage of selling assets. This
e¤ect stems from the second di¤erence between assets and securities  the sale of assets,
but not equity, may be motivated by dissynergies. Thus, low-quality rms can disguise
asset sales that are truly motivated by negative private information as being instead due
to dissynergies. Appendix C.2 shows that, in the case of negative correlation, this general
model continues to generate the correlation e¤ect of Section 1.2. Since this analysis only
demonstrates robustness but does not generate any new implications, we defer it to the
Appendix.
2.1 Pooling Equilibria
Proposition 3 gives conditions under which pooling equilibria are sustainable:
Proposition 3. (Positive correlation, pooling equilibria, voluntary capital raising.)
(i) An asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if and only if (ia) EHEL 
AH
AL
, (ib) 1+k  E[A]AL ,
13A rm may own dissynergistic assets because it initially acquired them when they were synergistic, but
they became dissynergistic over time. The rm may not have yet disposed of the dissynergistic asset for two
reasons. First, the rm may retain it due to the transactions costs of asset sales: only if it is forced to raise
nancing and so would have to bear the transactions costs of equity issuance otherwise, would it consider
selling assets. Second, the market for assets is not perfectly frictionless, and so not all assets are owned by
the best owner at all times. Our model allows for k = 0 in which case there are no dissynergies.
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and (ic) 1 + rH  AH(1+k)E[A] hold. The prices of assets and equity are AH + (1  )AL and
CL +AL + F (1 + rL) respectively.
(ii) An equity-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if and only if (iia) EHEL 
AH
AL
, (iib) 1 +
k  ELE[E] , and (iic) 1 + rH  EHE[E] hold. The prices of assets and equity are AL and
E[C +A] + F (E[1 + r]), respectively.
As in Proposition 1, condition (ia) ensures thatH-rms do not deviate to equity issuance
from an asset-pooling equilibrium, and (iia) ensures that H-rms do not deviate to asset
sales from an equity-pooling equilibrium. When investment opportunities are zero (rH =
rL = 0), (ia) reduces to the condition F  F  from Proposition 1. With positive investment
opportunities, it becomes
F [AH(1 + rL) AL(1 + rH)]  CHAL   CLAH : (4)
The sign of the RHS depends on whether CHCL 7
AH
AL
. We rst consider CHCL >
AH
AL
, as
this is the more realistic case for two main reasons. First, Appendix D shows that if rms
have the option to sell both the core and non-core asset, in a pooling equilibrium rms
only sell the asset with lower information asymmetry, and so we can label this asset as the
non-coreone. Second, the core business bears the risk of the rms future prospects, such
as its ability to launch new products and retain employees, whereas a separable non-core
asset (such as a factory or oileld) does not.
If CHCL >
AH
AL
, the RHS is positive. If the LHS is also positive (AHAL >
1+rH
1+rL
), (4) yields
F  F I  CHAL   CLAH
AH(1 + rL) AL(1 + rH) : (5)
In Section 1.1, the upper bound was F   CHAL CLAHAH AL . If F I < F , the balance sheet
strengthens compared to Section 1.1. This is clearly true if rL > rH , as Ls superior growth
options reduce the information asymmetry of equity. More surprisingly, F I < F  holds
even if rH  rL, as long as rHrL <
AH
AL
. To see why, note that RH = F (1 + rL)+F (rH   rL).
When rH > rL, the second term increases the information asymmetry of equity and indeed
raises F I compared to F , but the rst term, which is common to both RH and RL, has the
opposite e¤ect. Intuitively, F (1 + rL) is a minimum expected investment return regardless
of rm type: since the investment is positive-NPV, the certain component of the rms
balance sheet is now higher (F (1 + rL) rather than F ). Only when
rH
rL
> AHAL do we have
F I > F , weakening the balance sheet e¤ect compared to Section 1.1.14 Note that the only
di¤erence between F  and F I are the rL and rH terms; the synergy terms do not enter
into F I as they do not a¤ect the value of assets to outside investors.
14Note that equity issuance does not become more likely simply because the rm is worth more due to
its growth opportunities, which attracts investors. The growth opportunities are fully priced into the equity
issue and are not a freebie.
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If the LHS of (4) is negative (AHAL 
1+rH
1+rL
), then (4) is satised for any F : the upper
bound on F is innite. Intuitively, equityholders obtain a portfolio of assets in place (C+A)
and the new investment (R); F determines the weighting of the new investment in this port-
folio. H cooperates with asset sales if his capital loss, AHAL , is less than the weighted average
loss on this overall equity portfolio. If both the assets in place and the new investment
exhibit more information asymmetry than non-core assets, i.e., AHAL 
CH
CL
and AHAL 
1+rH
1+rL
,
then the loss on the equity portfolio is greater regardless of the weights.
The alternative inequality, CHCL <
AH
AL
, is an extreme case since it means that assets have
such high information asymmetry that asset sales can never be sustained for any F in the
core model: it yields F  < 0. In the model with investment, we similarly have F I < 0 if
the LHS of (4) is positive, i.e. AHAL >
1+rH
1+rL
. Intuitively, when non-core assets exhibit more
information asymmetry than both core assets and the new investment, then they exhibit
more information asymmetry than equity for any weight F . On the other hand, if CHCL <
AH
AL
and also AHAL <
1+rH
1+rL
, then the inequality in (5) becomes a lower bound on F , i.e. F  F I .
Now, asset-pooling is only sustainable for high F , as we need a high weight on investment
for the balance sheet to exhibit more information asymmetry than non-core assets.
In addition to demonstrating robustness, the extension to voluntary capital raising also
generates a new prediction. As rH falls and rL rises (the information asymmetry of invest-
ment falls), the upper bound on the asset-pooling equilibrium tightens and the lower bound
on the equity-pooling equilibrium loosens. Thus, the source of nancing also depends on
the use of nancing. If growth opportunities are good regardless of rm quality (rL is high,
for example in good macroeconomic conditions or a growing industry), then they are more
likely to be nanced using equity. The use of nancing also matters in models of moral
hazard (uses subject to agency problems will be nanced by debt rather than equity) or
bankruptcy costs (purchases of tangible assets are more likely to be nanced by debt rather
than equity); here it matters in a model of pure adverse selection. Moreover, our predictions
di¤er from a moral hazard model. Under moral hazard, if cash is to remain on the balance
sheet, equity is undesirable due to the agency costs of free cash ow (Jensen 1986). Here,
equity is preferred due to the balance sheet e¤ect.
We now turn to the new conditions for asset-pooling not in Proposition 1; the new
conditions for equity-pooling are analogous. Condition (ib) ensures that L does not deviate
to equity issuance. While L is making a capital gain from asset sales, it also loses (positive
or negative) synergies and so its incentive constraint is no longer trivial. 1+k  E[A]AL ensures
that, even for the L-rm with the greatest synergies (type
 
L; k

), the capital gain from
asset sales exceeds the synergy loss, and so no L-rm wishes to deviate to equity. Condition
(ic) ensures that H does not deviate to inaction (just as (ia) rules out deviation to equity
issuance). It states that Hs investment return is su¢ ciently high that he is willing to bear
the capital loss from raising nancing.
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2.2 Semi-Separating Equilibria
The pooling equilibria require (dis)synergies to be su¢ ciently weak that all rms are willing
to sell the same claim. If they are strong, we have a semi-separating equilibrium where rms
of the same quality sell either assets or equity depending on their level of synergy. This
equilibrium is characterized in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4. (Positive correlation, semi-separating equilibria, voluntary capital raising.)
(i) If 1+rH  EHEL , a semi-separating equilibrium in which type (q; k) sells assets (equity)
if k  (>) kq is sustainable if neither pair of conditions (1 + k  E[A]AL ,
EH
EL
 AHAL ) nor
(1 + k  ELE[E] , EHEL 
AH
AL
) is satised.
(ia) If EHEL >
AH
AL
, then kH > k

L: Assets are sold at a premium to their unconditional
expected value E [A], while equity is issued at a discount.
(ib) If EHEL <
AH
AL
, then kH < k

L. Equity is issued at a premium to its unconditional
expected value E [E], while assets are sold at a discount.
(ic) If EHEL =
AH
AL
, then kL = k

H = 0:
(ii) If 1+ rH  EHEL , a semi-separating equilibrium is sustainable in which H sells assets
if k  kH and does nothing if k > kH , and L sells assets if k  kL and issues equity if
k > kL, where k

L  0. A rise in rH increases both kH and kL.
(iia) If EHEL  1 + rH >
AH
AL
(1 + k), then kH > k and k

L > 0. The price of assets
exceeds AL and the price of equity is CL + AL + F (1 + rL). If 1 + rH > (<)
AH
AL
, then
kH > (<) k

L and assets are sold at a premium (discount) to their expected value E [A].
(iib) If 1 + rH  min

EH
EL
; AHAL (1 + k)

, then kH = k (all H-rms do nothing) and
kL = 0. The price of assets is AL and the price of equity is CL +AL + F (1 + rL).
(iii) If rH = rL = 0, then we have the same equilibria as in parts (iia) and (iib), except
that L-rms with k > kL(= 0) either issue equity or do nothing.
There are three cases to consider:
High rH. We start with part (i), where 1 + rH  EHEL ensures that the investment return
is su¢ ciently high that all rms raise nancing. The choice of nancing depends on both
components of type. First, it depends on synergy k: there is an equilibrium threshold kq ,
and any rm below (above) the threshold sells assets (equity). Second, it depends on quality
q, because H and L use di¤erent thresholds kq . The main result of part (i) is how F a¤ects
whether kH > (<) k

L, and thus whether H is more (less) willing to sell assets than L.
The role of F again arises through the balance sheet e¤ect. As demonstrated in condition
(4), the value of F determines whether EHEL 7
AH
AL
. If both sides of (4) are positive, it
simplies to F  F I , which generalizes the condition F  F  from Section 1.1. When
F < F I , and thus EHEL >
AH
AL
, equity exhibits higher information asymmetry than assets. As
a result, H is more willing to sell assets than L, and so uses a higher cuto¤ (kH > k

L). The
di¤erent cuto¤s in turn a¤ect the valuations. Since H is more willing to sell assets, the asset
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(equity) price is higher (lower) than its unconditional expectation. When F > F I , and
thus EHEL <
AH
AL
, the balance sheet e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong that equity is more attractive
to H (kH < k

L). The asset (equity) price is now lower (higher) than its unconditional
expectation.15 Finally, when F = F I , and thus EHEL =
AH
AL
, the information asymmetry of
assets and equity are the same, and so H and L use the same cuto¤.
Unlike in the pooling equilibria, here the impact of a stronger balance sheet e¤ect is
nuanced  it does not make one claim universally more popular, but instead increases
(reduces) the attractiveness of equity to high (low)-quality rms. This di¤erential e¤ect
contrasts with standard frictions, such as taxes, transactions costs, liquidity, and bargaining
power, which have the same directional e¤ect on all rms. Due to this di¤erential e¤ect,
changes in F a¤ect the price and quality of assets sold in the real asset market, as well as
the price and quality of equity. Assets (equity) that are sold for nancing reasons should
fetch lower (higher) prices if the sale is large, as large sales are more likely to stem from
low- (high-) quality rms.
Moderate rH: Camouage E¤ect. Part (iia) shows that if rH is moderate, H-rms with
synergistic assets will not raise capital at all, since the return on investment is insu¢ cient to
outweigh the loss from capital raising. This echoes an intuition in MM: high-quality rms
forgo investment due to the cost of nancing. However, H-rms with su¢ ciently dissyner-
gistic assets still sell them, not so much to nance investment but to get rid of dissynergies:
the gain from doing do, when added to the (minor) return on investment, outweighs the
capital loss from asset sales. As before, L sells either equity or assets (depending on its
synergy level), not so much to nance investment, but to exploit overvaluation.
The key result is kL > 0: L prefers asset sales, and will sell assets even if they are
synergistic. The reason is the camouage e¤ect. Since the growth opportunity is only
moderate, it is too weak to induce H to issue equity. Thus, the only reason to issue equity
is if it is low-quality, and so equity issuance reveals the rm as L. In contrast, asset sales
may be undertaken because the asset is either low-quality (low common value, sold by L)
or dissynergistic (low private value, sold by H), and so the asset price exceeds AL. This
high price induces L to sell assets (kL > 0). Here, an increase in rH augments k

H , as H is
more willing to sell assets. Then assets provide even better camouage, so kL rises also.
Note that, for any semi-separating equilibrium, there may be said to be camouage
in that multiple types pool into the same action. MM and its extensions (e.g. Cooney
and Kalay 1993, Wu and Wang 2005) also feature a non-informational motive the desire
to nance investment which allows sellers to camouage the disposal of an overvalued
claim. However, those motives can be used to disguise both asset and equity sales, and
15We also have kH < 0: H retains assets even if they are mildly dissynergistic, due to their higher
information asymmetry. Similarly, for F < F , we have kH > 0: even H-rms with positive synergies are
willing to sell assets, due to their lower information asymmetry.
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so do not a¤ect a rms choice between them.16 We use the term camouage e¤ect to
refer specically to the ability to disguise a sale as motivated by dissynergies, rather than
non-informational motives in general, which applies only to assets.17
Indeed, in the equilibrium of (iia), investment opportunities are too weak to motivate
capital raising (1 + rH <
EH
EL
)  the only non-overvaluation motive is dissynergies, which
only apply to assets, and so they lead H to sell assets but not to issue equity. Thus, while
assets are priced above AL, equity is priced at the lowest possible value of EL assets o¤er
camouage and equity does not, and so L exhibits a strict preference for assets (kL > 0).
In contrast, when 1 + rH >
EH
EL
(part (i)), we cannot sign kL. When the investment
return is good, H sells both assets and equity (to nance the investment) and so both o¤er
camouage; thus, L exhibits no clear preference between them.
Just like the balance sheet e¤ect, the camouage e¤ect also applies to the choice between
asset sales and risky debt, as shown in Appendix B. Absent a protable growth opportunity,
the issue of risky debt signals that the debt is overvalued, since it cannot be camouaged
as stemming from an operational reason, unlike an asset sale.
Low rH. Part (iib) shows that if rH is low and dissynergies are not severe (1 + rH 
AH
AL
(1 + k)), even H-rms with the most dissynergistic assets do nothing. Information
asymmetry AHAL is so strong that the capital loss from asset sales is high relative to both
the growth opportunity rH and the dissynergy motive k. Since no H-rms sell assets, asset
sales do not o¤er camouage. Thus, kL = 0: L no longer prefers asset sales.
Part (iii) shows that, if rH = rL = 0, even L has no reason to issue equity: it cannot
exploit overvaluation since there is no camouage, and it cannot invest the cash raised
protably. Thus, low-quality rms with synergistic assets (k > kL(= 0)) are indi¤erent
between selling equity and inaction. Indeed, there exists an equilibrium where all L-rms
with k > 0 do nothing, and so the equity market shuts down. Absent an investment
opportunity, the only reason to sell equity is if it is low-quality, and so the no-trade
theorem applies. In contrast, asset sales may be motivated by operational reasons and so
the market continues to function.
We now analyze comparative statics that a¤ect the type of semi-separating equilibrium
((i), (iia), (iib), or (iii)) that is sustainable:
E¤ect of rH. This parameter captures investment opportunities of high-quality rms
which, among other things, will be correlated with the business cycle. We start with the
16 In Eisfeldt (2004), higher investment opportunities encourage rms to issue more claims; since there is
only one class of risky assets (excluding cash and realized payo¤s from past projects), these claims can be
interpreted as either assets or equity.
17 In contrast, we do not label the semi-separating equilibrium of part (i) as exhibiting a camouage e¤ect:
even though multiple rm types pool on the same action, this is similar to any semi-separating equilibrium
and does not arise from H voluntarily selling assets due to dissynergies. All rms raise capital since the
growth opportunity is su¢ ciently attractive, and so when H prefers to sell assets (kH > 0), it is because
assets exhibit less informational asymmetry than equity rather than assets being dissynergistic.
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e¤ect of rH on asset sales. When 1 + rH falls from moderate to low (i.e. drops below
AH
AL
(1 + k)), we switch from (iia) to (iib). Then, H no longer sells assets for dissynergy
motives. In turn, the decline in asset sales by H is amplied by L (kL falls to zero) since
the camouage e¤ect disappears. Thus, the camouage e¤ect leads to multiplier e¤ects
 exogenous factors that deter H from selling assets also then deter L. Indeed, Eisfeldt
and Rampini (2006) nd empirically that asset sales are procyclical because, when growth
opportunities are low, asset liquidity (the price of sold assets) falls. Here, when 1+rH drops
below AHAL (1 + k), the asset price falls to AL.
We now turn to the e¤ect rH on equity issuance. When rH is high, we are in case (i) in
which both H and L sell both assets and equity. Thus, while large rises in rH that switch
the equilibrium from (iib) to (i) increase the aggregate issuance of both claims, moderate
rises that switch it to (iia) increase aggregate asset sales but decrease equity issuance: assets
respond to rises in rH before equity does. The fall in equity issuance arises because a shift
to (iia) causes H-rms to start to sell assets but not to issue equity, and such behavior
encourages some L-rms to switch from equity to asset sales due to the camouage e¤ect.
E¤ect of F. The equilibrium in part (i), where all rms sell either assets or equity, exhibits
greater real e¢ ciency than the one in part (iia) since all rms are undertaking protable
investment. It is easier to satisfy the condition for part (i) (1+rH  EHEL ) if F is high. Thus,
a greater scale of investment opportunities (high F ) encourages H to invest, even if the per-
unit productivity of investment (rH) is unchanged. The balance sheet e¤ect reduces the
per-unit cost of nancing, whereas scale e¤ects typically considered in the literature (e.g.,
limited supply of capital) increase the per-unit cost of nancing. Thus, a higher F has
benecial real consequences by encouraging investment.
Finally, we consider the interesting special case where there is no information asymmetry
about the non-core asset, i.e. AH = AL. Then, condition (ib) in Proposition 3 becomes
1 + k  1, which can never be satised, and so asset-pooling is unsustainable. Since assets
exhibit no information asymmetry, L makes no capital gains from selling them, and so any
L with positive synergies deviates to equity. In addition, condition (iia) in Proposition
3 becomes EHEL  1, which can never be satised, and so equity-pooling is unsustainable.
When assets have zero information asymmetry, any H-rm with weakly negative synergies
will sell them similar to the MM intuition that information-insensitive claims are sold rst,
absent operational reasons. As a result, the only possible equilibria are semi-separating 
case (ia), (iia), or (iii) from Proposition 4, depending on whether rH is high, medium,
or low. Note that in cases (ia) and (iia), we now have a positive stock price reaction to
asset sales regardless of the value of F  since assets have zero information asymmetry,
they automatically have less information asymmetry than equity regardless of F , and so
the balance sheet e¤ect is no longer important. This special case shows that information
asymmetry about A is necessary to make the balance sheet e¤ect relevant, but is not
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necessary for the camouage e¤ect: the equilibrium in case (iia) can still hold.
3 Empirical Implications
This section discusses the main implications of the model. While some are consistent with
existing empirical ndings, many are new and untested, and are potential questions for
future research.
3.1 Determinants of Financing Choice
The rst set of empirical implications concerns the determinants of nancing choice.
Amount of Financing Required. Proposition 1 shows that equity is preferred for high
nancing needs, due to the balance sheet e¤ect, while asset sales are preferred for lower
needs. For example, large oil and gas companies typically expand by adding individual elds,
which require low F ; indeed, this industry exhibits an active market for asset sales. A related
implication is that equity issuances should represent a larger percentage of rm size than
nancing-motivated asset sales. This result may also shed light on previous empirical studies
of external nance. An analysis excluding asset sales might infer from the infrequency of
nancing that it is subject to large, indirect costs. For example, Hennessy and Whited
(2007) nd that rms behave as if facing a cost of 8.3% on the rst million dollars of equity
raised, versus underwriting fees of only 5.1% reported in Altinkilic and Hansen (2000). Our
model suggests that, if asset sales were also included in external nancing, observed external
nancing would be both smaller and more frequent, implying lower indirect costs.
Use of Proceeds. Both the balance sheet and camouage e¤ects predict that the probabil-
ity of equity issuance is increasing if growth opportunities improve across the board (rL and
rH are high). Proposition 4 shows that the balance sheet e¤ect is stronger when nancing
an investment opportunity that is attractive regardless of rm quality (rL is high). Turning
to the camouage e¤ect, if rH is low, high-quality rms do not issue equity, and low-quality
rms prefer asset sales as only they can provide camouage. When rH increases above a
threshold, not only do high-quality rms start to issue equity to exploit the growth oppor-
tunity, but also low-quality rms issue equity to a greater extent, as they can camouage
themselves with high-quality equity issuers.
Thus, rms where growth opportunities are known to be good should raise equity. For
example, a technology shock that increases investment opportunities across an industry
(such as the invention of fracking for the energy sector, or an increase in processing speed for
the computer sector) should make equity issuance more likely. In a strong macroeconomic
environment, even low-quality rms will have good investment projects and so equity is
again preferred, as found by Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993). Covas and den Haan (2011)
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show that equity issuance is procyclical, except for the very largest rms. A separate
prediction from the balance sheet e¤ect is that equity is more likely to be used for purposes
with less information asymmetry, such as paying debt or replenishing capital.
Firm Characteristics. A third determinant of nancing choice is rm characteristics.
Single-segment rms are more likely to issue equity; rms with negatively-correlated assets
prefer asset sales due to the correlation e¤ect. Thus, conglomerates are more likely to sell
assets than rms with closely-related divisions, and more likely to sell non-core assets than
core assets (see Appendix D). Indeed, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) nd that conglom-
erates are more likely to sell peripheral divisions than main divisions. While consistent
with the correlation e¤ect, this result could also stem from operational reasons: peripheral
divisions are more likely to be dissynergistic. Maksimovic and Phillips also nd that less-
productive divisions are more likely to be sold. This result is consistent with the idea that
conglomerates can sell poorly-performing divisions without creating negative inferences on
the rest of the rm, although they do not study the market reaction to such sales.
3.2 Market Reactions to Financing
A second set of empirical implications concerns the market reaction to nancing. In the
negative correlation case, and in the positive correlation case where kH > k

L (low F ), asset
(equity) sales lead to a positive (negative) stock price reaction. Indeed, Jain (1985), Klein
(1986), Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987), Slovin, Sushka, and Ferraro (1995), and Feldman
(2014), among others, nd evidence of the former; a long line of empirical research beginning
with Asquith and Mullins (1986) documents the latter. Under positive correlation and high
F , we have kL > k

H , and so equity issuance leads to a positive reaction.
18 Holderness
(2017) nds a positive reaction in some countries, but does not relate it to the size of the
equity issue or the correlation structure of the issuer. Separately, the model also predicts
that equity issuance will typically lead to a more negative reaction for conglomerates (where
negative correlation is likely) than for single-segment rms.
3.3 Synergy Motives
Our next implications concern synergy motives for asset sales. Testing these implications
is harder for the econometrician, who is rarely able to measure synergies, but they are still
relevant for managers, who are better able to estimate synergies.
Market Depth. Firms are more willing to sell assets in deep markets where others
are selling for operational reasons, providing camouage. One potential way to estimate
18Cooney and Kalay (1993) and Wu and Wang (2005) show that an extension of MM can also generate
positive returns to equity issuance. The sign of the return depends on the uncertainty about the growth
opportunity; here it depends on the size of the equity issue and the correlation structure of the issuer.
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(dis)synergies is to compare across industries. For example, in the oil and gas industry, asset
sales frequently involve self-contained plants with little scope for synergies. In consumer-
facing industries where multiple products are cross-sold to the same customer base, op-
erational motives should be stronger. A more general implication of the model is that
there will be multiplier e¤ects. A rise in operational motives for asset sales also encourages
overvaluation-motivated asset sales, as the seller can camouage the disposal as resulting
from dissynergies.
Interaction Between Synergies and Amount of Financing. The link between the
source of nancing and the amount required is stronger with fewer synergies. With weak
synergies, only pooling equilibria are sustainable, and so when F is high (low), all rms
sell equity (assets). With strong synergies, we have a semi-separating equilibrium, and so
even when F is high (low), some rms are selling assets (equity). Put di¤erently, with weak
synergies, rms will issue the same type of claim for a given nancing requirement; with
strong synergies, we should observe greater heterogeneity in nancing choices across rms.
Firm Quality. Equity issuers are likely to have synergistic assets, and asset sellers are
likely to be parting with dissynergistic ones. Moreover, high-quality rms are more likely
to sell synergistic assets if their nancing needs are low, whereas low-quality rms are more
likely to do so if their nancing needs are high.
4 Conclusion
This paper has studied a rms choice between nancing through asset sales and the issuance
of securities, such as equity, under asymmetric information. A direct extension of MM would
imply that rms will issue the claim that exhibits the least information asymmetry. While
information asymmetry is indeed relevant, there are two key di¤erences between assets and
equity, absent from the MM framework, which in turn lead to three new forces that govern
the nancing decision.
The rst key di¤erence is that a purchaser of non-core assets obtains a claim to the
assets alone, whereas a purchaser of securities owns a claim to the rms entire balance
sheet. This leads to two new forces. The rst is the balance sheet e¤ect, which represents
an advantage to selling equity. Since the rms balance sheet includes the amount of funds
raised, which is known, this reduces the information asymmetry of equity but not assets,
particularly if the amount of funds raised is high. Thus, low (high) nancing needs are
met through asset (equity) sales: the amount of nancing required a¤ects the choice of
nancing, and consequently rm boundaries. This result is robust to using the cash to
nance an uncertain investment.
The second new force is the correlation e¤ect, which represents an advantage to selling
assets. Since equity is a carbon copy of the rms balance sheet, issuing it lead to a lemons
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discount not only on the equity being sold, but also the rest of the rm as a whole, reducing
its stock price. In contrast, an asset sold need not be a carbon copy of the rm, because it
is not a claim to the rms balance sheet.
The second key di¤erence is that the sale of assets but not equity can be motivated
by operational reasons (synergies). This leads to the third new force, the camouage e¤ect,
which also represents an advantage to selling assets. When rms have discretion over
whether to raise nancing, and growth opportunities are moderate, high-quality rms will
not issue equity but may still sell assets if they are dissynergistic. This allows low-quality
rms to pool with them, disguising their capital raising as being motivated by operational
reasons rather than overvaluation. This camouage e¤ect leads low-quality rms to sell
assets even if they are synergistic.
In sum, our model predicts that equity issuance is preferred when the amount of nanc-
ing required is high, if growth opportunities are good, and for uses about which there is
little information asymmetry (e.g., repaying debt or replenishing capital). Asset sales are
preferred if the rm has non-core assets that exhibit little information asymmetry or are
dissynergistic, if other rms are currently selling assets for operational reasons, and if the
asset has a low correlation with the core business (e.g. in a conglomerate).
This paper suggests a number of avenues for future research. On the empirical side, it
gives rise to a number of new predictions, particularly relating to the amount of nancing
required and the purpose for which funds are raised. On theoretical side, a number of
extensions are possible. One would be to allow for other sources of asset-level capital
raising, such as equity carve-outs.19 Since issuing asset-level debt or equity does not involve
a loss of (dis)synergies, a carve-out is equivalent to asset sales if synergies are zero  a
carve-out also benets from the correlation e¤ect as it need not imply low quality for the
rm as a whole, but not the balance sheet e¤ect as investors only own a claim to the asset,
not the parent companys balance sheet where the new funds reside. However, if synergies
are non-zero, asset sales but not carve-outs benet from the camouage e¤ect, so it would
be interesting to analyze the case in which synergies are non-zero and the rm has a choice
between asset sales, carve-outs, and equity issuance. Another restriction of the model is
that, even when rms can choose whether to raise capital, they raise a xed amount F
(as in MM, Cooney and Kalay 1993, and Nachman and Noe 1994), since there is a single
investment opportunity with a known scale of F . An additional extension would be to
allow for multiple investment opportunities of di¤erent scale, to generate predictions for the
amount of capital raised in equilibrium in addition to the source.
19Nanda (1991) also notes that non-core assets may be uncorrelated with the core business and that this
may motivate carve-outs. In his model, correlation is always zero and the information asymmetry of core
and non-core assets is identical. Our model allows for general correlations and information asymmetries, as
well as synergies, enabling us to generate balance sheet, camouage, and correlation e¤ects.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
For either pooling equilibrium, let X 2 fA;Eg represent the pooling claim and ~X the
o¤-equilibrium claim. Let ~ represent the o¤-equilibrium path belief (OEPB), where ~
is investorsposterior probability that q = H for a deviating rm. We rst show that D1
requires ~ = 0 under the conditions stated in the Proposition and then show that rms
cooperate given this OEPB.
Firms cooperate if their unit cost of nancingis weakly lower for X than ~X,
Xq
E[X]

~Xq
~XL + ~( ~XH   ~XL)
8 q 2 fH;Lg; (6)
which can be rewritten as
Xq
~Xq
 E[X]
~XL + ~( ~XH   ~XL)
: (7)
Note that the Propositions conditions (F  F  for an asset-pooling equilibrium (APE)
and F  F  for an equity-pooling equilibrium (EPE)) both imply that the pooling claim
features weakly less information asymmetry than the o¤-equilibrium claim:
XH
XL

~XH
~XL
: (8)
First, consider the OEPBs that are allowable under D1. If (8) holds, then the LHS of
(7) is maximized for L, so L has the stronger incentive to deviate. Then the set of OEPBs
under which H deviates is a subset of those under which L deviates. To show that this
subset is strict, note that L cooperates if ~ = 0 but deviates if ~ = 1. Because the conditions
are continuous in ~, there must be some value of ~ at which L is indi¤erent. Then, because
H has a strictly stronger incentive to cooperate, there must be some slightly higher value
of ~ at which L deviates but H cooperates. Thus, if (8) holds, then D1 requires ~ = 0.
With this, (7) is satised for L, and then also for H who has the strictly stronger incentive
to cooperate.
Conversely, if (8) is violated, then H has the stronger incentive to deviate. so the set of
beliefs under which L deviates is a subset of those under which H deviates. Here, we can
show that this subset is strict by noting that H cooperates at ~ = 1 but deviates at ~ = 0.
Again, continuity implies that there is some ~ at which H deviates while L does not. Then
D1 requires ~ = 1, and given this belief the equilibrium is not sustainable, as (7) is violated
for H. Thus, (8) is both necessary and su¢ cient for the pooling equilibria to be sustainable
and satisfy D1.
Proof of Proposition 2
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We rst show that an EPE is unsustainable, by demonstrating that the only OEPB that
satises D1 is that an asset seller is of type H, and that some H-rms will automatically
deviate under such an OEPB. Given an OEPB ~, type q deviates to assets if and only if
! [(~   )((CH   CL)  (AL  AH))] > (1  !)F

Aq
AL   ~(AL  AH)  
Eq
E[E]

: (9)
The LHS is independent of q. The RHS is lower for q = H than for q = L, so the OEPBs
under which L deviates to assets are a subset of those under which H deviates. We can
show that they are a strict subset using an analogous argument to the proof of Proposition
1.
Under the OEPB that a deviator is H, the stock price CH + AH upon selling assets
and being inferred as H is higher than that upon pooling on equity E[C + A]. An H-rm
deviating to assets receives this higher stock price and sells assets at a fair value compared
to su¤ering a fundamental loss on equity issuance. Thus, any rm with q = H will deviate
to assets, and so EPE is unsustainable.
We now discuss the conditions under which an APE is sustainable. We rst show that
no rm wishes to deviate under condition (3) and the OEPB that a deviator is of type L,
and then show that this is the only OEPB that satises D1.
Under the equilibrium, L sells assets worth AL at the pooled price of AH +(1 )AL,
and its stock price is (CH + AH) + (1   )(CL + AL). If L deviates to equity, it will be
valued correctly at EL and its stock price will be CL+AL, so its objective function is simply
CL +AL. L will thus cooperate with asset sales if
!((CH +AH) + (1  )(CL +AL))
+ (1  !)

CL +AL + F   F

AL
AH + (1  )AL

 CL +AL;
which simplies to (3). Note that both the numerator and denominator of (3) are positive.
We now show that, in APE, the only OEPB that satises D1 is that a deviator to equity
is of type L. The proof is similar to the EPE analysis. Type q deviates if and only if
!

(~   )((CH   CL)  (AL  AH))

> (1  !)F

Eq
EL + ~(EH   EL)  
Aq
E[A]

(10)
Inequality (10) is easier to satisfy for q = L than for q = H, since EL < EH and
AL > AH . Therefore, the beliefs under which H deviates are a subset of those under which
L deviates. We can show that they are a strict subset using an analogous argument to the
proof of Proposition 1. Thus, the only OEPB that satises D1 is that an equity issuer is
type L.
Proof of Proposition 3
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The conditions to ensure that neither H nor L deviate are given by:
c(X; q; k)
E[X]
 c(
~X; q; k)
~XL + ~( ~XH   ~XL)
8 (q; k) 2 fH;Lg  [k; k] (11)
1 + rq  c(X; q; k)E[X] 8 (q; k) 2 fH;Lg  [k; k] (12)
The rst condition (11) is similar to (6) in the proof of Proposition 1, but with some
changes. First, we dene a function c(X; q; k) that measures the fundamental loss to a rm
of type (q; k) choosing claim X. Thus, c(A; q; k) = Aq(1 + k) and c(E; q; k) = Eq. Second,
the denition of equity value Eq includes the investment return rq, Third, the condition
must hold for all k as well as both q values. Given ~ = 0 (see below), the condition holds
for all k if and only if the Propositions conditions (ib) (for APE) and (iib) (for EPE) are
satised.
We also have a new set of conditions (12) to prevent any rms from deviating to inaction.
Intuitively, the investment return must exceed the unit cost of nancing. This yields the
conditions 1 + rL  AL(1+k)E[A] and 1 + rH  AH(1+k)E[A] for APE, and 1 + rL  ELE[E] and
1 + rH  EHE[E] for EPE. The rst APE condition is implied by (ib) since rL  0, and the
rst EPE condition is implied by EL < EH . This leaves us with conditions (ic) and (iic)
stated in the Proposition.
Next, we conrm that the o¤-equilibrium valuation of ~X at XL is consistent with D1.
Analogous to Proposition 1, conditions (ia) and (iia) guarantee that the pooling claim in
either equilibrium is subject to less information asymmetry than the o¤-equilibrium claim,
and this in turn is enough to imply that, for any value of k, (11) is more easily satised for
type (H; k) than for type (L; k), and so the belief that a deviator is of quality L satises
D1.20
Finally, we must check that, when L would prefer ~X to X, it would not prefer inaction
even more. This is automatic, since inequality (12) already guarantees that the rm prefers
X to inaction. Thus, if L prefers ~X to X, it also prefers ~X to inaction.
Proof of Proposition 4
Case (i)
First, we note that 1+ rH >
EH
EL
implies that all rms raise capital, as every rm prefers
equity issuance to inaction, although some will prefer asset sales even more. Thus, rq does
not further a¤ect case (i) except by implicitly appearing in the value of E.21
Second, given that all rms raise nancing, we analyze each rms choice between equity
and asset sales. Dene kq as the equilibrium cuto¤ value below (above) which q sells assets
20We do not need to specify the OEPB about k as they do not a¤ect the purchaser.
21As stated, the inequality contains rH on both sides. We can solve for rH to restate the condition as
1 + rH >
CH+AH
CL+AL+FrL
.
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(equity). If the cuto¤ is interior kq 2 (k; k), it is dened by equating the unit cost of
nancing of these two sources, 1 + kq =
Eq
Aq
E[AjX=A]
E[EjX=E] . If both cuto¤s are interior, this
denition implies 1 + kH =  (1 + k

L), where   EHEL

AH
AL
, which is decreasing in F . Thus,
any equilibrium is dened by its value of kL, from which k

H = (1 + k

L)  1 if this value is
in the interval (k; k), and otherwise is equal to the nearer endpoint of this interval.
The proof will involve specifying candidate equilibria, which are summarized by a can-
didate cuto¤ k0L (and implied value of k
0
H by the reasoning above), then evaluating the
incentives of rms at those cuto¤ values. The candidate cuto¤s constitute an equilibrium
if, for any interior cuto¤s, rms at those cuto¤s are exactly indi¤erent between asset sales
and equity issuance; while for any boundary cuto¤s, rms at those cuto¤s weakly prefer the
specied action.
Before proceeding, we make two observations:
First, observe that the value of F determines the price reaction to the nancing choice,
by determining whether or not EHEL 7
AH
AL
. The general relationship between F and this
inequality is given in condition (4). If both sides of the condition are positive, this yields
EH
EL
> AHAL if and only if F < F
I , which generalizes the condition F < F  from the model
of Section 1.1. If EHEL > (<)
AH
AL
, then  > (<) 1, which implies kH > (<) k

L from the
relationship 1+ kH = (1+ k

L). This ordering of the cuto¤s determines the price reaction:
If kH > (<)k

L, then E[AjX = A] > (<)E[A] and E[EjX = E] < (>)E[E].
Second, dene the value k^  ELAL
E[A]
E[E] , and observe that this value is strictly between
the values ELE[E] and
E[A]
AL
from cases (ib) and (iib) respectively of Proposition 1. Thus, if
synergies are stronger than allowed for in Proposition 1, then k^ is guaranteed to be strictly
between k and k.
Now consider the case EHEL >
AH
AL
. Suppose we specify as a candidate equilibrium k0L = k,
which implies k0H = k as well. Given these cuto¤s, and the assumption 1 + k >
E[A]
AL
, then
(L; k) strictly prefers equity issuance. On the other hand, suppose we specify as a candidate
equilibrium k0L = k^ and 1 + k
0
H = min

(1 + k^); 1 + k

. Given these cuto¤s, (L; k^) strictly
prefers asset sales, as can be seen by examining the relevant inequality AL(1+k^)E[AjX=A] <
EL
E[EjX=E] ,
which simplies to E[A]E[AjX=A] <
E[E]
E[EjX=E] , which in turn is satised by the price reactions
given above for the case EHEL >
AH
AL
. The continuity of the expressions implies that there is a
value kL between k^ and k at which (L; k

L) is indi¤erent between selling equity and assets.
By construction, (H; kH)s incentives will also satisfy the equilibrium conditions when k

H is
determined by 1+kH = min((1+k

L); 1+k), Thus, the value of k

L denes an equilibrium.
Now consider EHEL <
AH
AL
. Suppose we specify as a candidate equilibrium k0H = k
0
L = k.
Given these cuto¤s, and the assumption 1 + k < ELE[E] , then (L; k) strictly prefers asset
sales. On the other hand, suppose we specify as a candidate equilibrium k0L = k^ and
1+ k0H = max

(1 + k^); 1 + k

. Given these cuto¤s, (L; k^) strictly prefers equity issuance,
34
as can be seen by examining the relevant inequality ELE[EjX=E] <
AL(1+k^)
E[AjX=A] , which simplies
to E[E]E[EjX=E] <
E[A]
E[AjX=A] , which in turn is satised by the price reactions above for the case
EH
EL
< AHAL . The continuity of the expressions involved then implies that there is a value k

L
between k^ and k at which (L; kL) is just indi¤erent between equity issuance and asset sales.
By construction, (H; kH)s incentives will also satisfy the equilibrium conditions when k

H is
determined by 1+kH = max((1+k

L); 1+k), Thus, the value of k

L denes an equilibrium.
Case (ii)
The major di¤erence is that some rms prefer inaction to either nancing source. Since
H is more likely to prefer inaction, it is rH (rather than rL) that moves us from case (i)
to case (ii). Moreover, among H rms, the ones more likely to switch to inaction are those
issuing equity in case (i), i.e. those with k > kH , as their assets are su¢ ciently synergistic
that they choose to retain them. The fundamental loss to equity issuance is the same for
all H rms regardless of k, so as r decreases compared to case (i), there is a cuto¤ below
which all H rms with k > kH shift from equity issuance to inaction.
To derive this cuto¤ value, observe that when all H rms strictly prefer inaction to
equity issuance, any equity issued is valued at EL, and the H rms with k > kH weakly
prefer inaction if 1+ rH  EHEL , i.e., the capital loss from selling undervalued equity exceeds
the investment return. This yields the condition 1 + rH 7 EHEL that di¤erentiates case (i)
from case (ii).
The indi¤erence condition dening kH , if that cuto¤ is interior, is now
AH(1+k

H)
E[AjX=A] = 1+rH .
On the other hand, L-rms will not deviate to inaction, as they always enjoy a weakly-
positive fundamental gain plus the investment return, and thus should at least be willing to
issue equity. The indi¤erence condition for L between asset sales and equity issuance yields
kL = min

k; E[AjX=A]AL   1

.
We have kL > 0 if and only if k

H > k, that is, if and only if some H rms sell assets.
In turn, we have kH > k if and only if 1 + rH >
AH
AL
(1 + k), as otherwise even (H; k) would
strictly prefer inaction to selling assets. This is the condition distinguishing case (iia) from
case (iib). When this condition does not hold, we move to case (iib) with kH = k and
kL = 0.
Case (iii)
This case is almost identical to case (iib), except that L-rms are now indi¤erent between
equity issuance and inaction as they do not make a capital gain nor a positive investment
return. Thus an equilibrium is sustainable in which no rms raise nancing, except for
L-rms with k < 0, who sell assets simply to get rid of dissynergies.
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Online Appendix for Financing Through Asset Sales
B Risky Debt
This section allows the rm to sell debt, in addition to equity and assets. We show rst the
robustness of the balance sheet e¤ect to allowing for debt issuance, and then the robustness
of the camouage and correlation e¤ects.
We label debt issuance X = D. Under this action, the rm o¤ers to repay debtholders
a face value P ; if it defaults, debtholders conscate the rms entire balance sheet. As
the model currently stands, the nancing decision becomes trivial since the rm can o¤er
risk-free debt with a face value of F , since F  min(AL; AH). Thus, to make the problem
nontrivial, we assume that risk-free debt capacity has been used up (as in MM) and also
introduce a risk of the rm being insolvent. As in Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2003), and Hennessy, Livdan,
and Miranda (2010), the rm faces the risk of a catastrophic event. Specically, with
probability (w.p.) p, this event shrinks the rms balance sheet to a fraction  2 (0; 1)
of its original value, where  and p are type-independent and EH < F , so that debt is
risky for all rm types. The shock applies to the rms entire balance sheet, i.e. both
assets in place and the new funds raised, else the rm could again borrow risk-free debt of
F . For example, the funds are invested in a zero-NPV project that is subject to the same
risks as the rms technology.22 Alternatively, as argued by Hennessy, Livdan, and Miranda
(2010), the catastrophic event may result from mass tort claims for defective products or
expropriation by a government,which would apply to the new funds raised even if they
were held as cash.
When the non-core asset is sold and separated from the rm, we assume that it continues
to face the risk of a shock. For example, the shock could represent market demand or product
liability connected with the output produced by the asset. This assumption is non-critical;
if the sold assets were not subject to the shock, this would create an additional advantage
to asset sales, but the e¤ects that we demonstrate would still apply at the margin.
B.1 Comparison of Debt and Equity
We rst examine the choice between debt and equity issuance under positive correlation. In
the core model, the rms fundamental value under equity issuance is (Cq+Aq+F )(1 x),
where x is the fraction of the rms balance sheet sold to new shareholders. With shocks,
22 In a model with zero investment return, this assumption implies that nancing is negative-NPV, because
the rm sells claims with a market value of F but obtains capital worth only (1  p+ p)F in expectation.
As in Section 2, if rms have the option of inaction, we must introduce a su¢ ciently high investment return
to induce them to raise nancing; other than that, the following intuition is unchanged. For simplicity, we
focus here on the case in which the rm is forced to raise capital.
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it becomes (1   p + p)(Cq + Aq + F )(1   x). New shareholders demand x such that
E[x(1 p+p)(Cq+Aq+F )jX = E] = F , which yields x = F(1 p+p)E[Cq+Aq+F jX=E] . Thus
fundamental value becomes (1  p+ p)(Cq +Aq + F ) 

Cq+Aq+F
E[C+A+F jX=E]

 F .
Under debt issuance, fundamental value is (1   p)(Cq + Aq + F   P ): w.p. 1   p, the
rm is solvent and pays P ; w.p. p, creditors liquidate the rm. Comparing fundamental
values, the rm (weakly) prefers debt to equity if and only if
(1  p)P + p(Cq +Aq + F )
F
 Cq +Aq + F
E[Cq +Aq + F jX = E] (13)
Creditors value their promised payment of P at (1  p)P + p E[C +A+ F jX = D].
This intuitively resembles a portfolio of risk-free debt and equity, which is why the core
models results for equity also apply to debt, as we show below. While P is an endogenous
variable, it is independent of the rms type, since it is set by uninformed investors. In
equilibrium, creditors demand P such that F = (1   p)P + p  E[C + A + F jX = D].
Substituting this expression into the denominator of the LHS, (13) becomes
(1  p)P + p(Cq +Aq + F )
(1  p)P + pE[Cq +Aq + F jX = D] 
Cq +Aq + F
E[Cq +Aq + F jX = E] (14)
DeningDq  (1  p)P+p (Cq +Aq + F ), (14) becomes DqE[DjX=D]  EqE[EjX=E] , i.e. the
unit cost of nancing is lower for debt than equity, as is intuitive. This inequality will always
hold, as in the standard pecking order. Ignoring the conditioning on X = D and X = E
and the (1  p)P terms on the LHS, both sides of (14) are equal. Adding the (1  p)P
term to the numerator and denominator of the LHS reduces the unit cost of debt below
that of equity and towards 1. Intuitively, adding a probability 1  p of a type-independent
payment P reduces the information asymmetry of debt relative to that of equity. As a
result, given any valuations for debt and equity, H always has the strongest incentive to
deviate from equity to debt.23 Thus, an equity-pooling equilibrium is unsustainable: D1
would require that a debt issuer is inferred as H, and under this inference, H would deviate.
Since no semi-separating equilibrium is possible either, only a debt-pooling equilibrium is
sustainable.
Inequality (14) provides further intuition about the nature of debt in this model. If
p = 1, then debt is riskless; if p = 0 (default is certain) then debt is identical to equity.
Interestingly, the unit cost of debt nancing falls as  decreases, because it lowers the
information asymmetry over liquidation value. In the limit where  = 0, liquidation value
is zero and the debt claim simply pays P with probability 1 p, and so there is no information
23To see this, rearrange the above inequality to isolate the terms depending on q: A rm prefers debt
issuance if and only if (1 p)V+p(Cq+Aq+F )
Cq+Aq+F
<
(1 p)V+pE[Cq+Aq+F jX=D]
E[Cq+Aq+F jX=E] . The LHS simplies to p +
(1 p)V
Cq+Aq+F
and is thus always minimized for type H.
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asymmetry. Finally, the derivative of the unit cost of debt with respect to F is
 p
F
2
(E[C+
AjX = E]   (Cq + Aq)), which is the same as for equity up to a positive multiple. This
expression is positive for q = L and negative for q = H, so (as with the equity claim)
increasing F lowers the unit cost for type H, because it lowers the amount of information
asymmetry in the claim. This is the balance sheet e¤ect, which applies to risky debt as well
as equity. As a result, the remaining analysis of risky debt looks very similar to the core
models analysis of equity.
B.2 Comparison of Debt and Asset Sales
Next, we analyze the choice between asset sales and debt issuance, which is similar to
the choice between assets and equity. The rms objective function under asset sales is
(1 p+p)(Cq+Aq xAq(1+k)+F ), where x is the fraction of assets that must be sold to
meet the nancing need. Investors set x such that E[x(1  p+ p)AqjX = A] = F , yielding
x = F(1 p+p)E[Aq jX=A] , so the objective function simplies to (1  p+ p)(Cq +Aq + F ) 
F

Aq(1+k)
E[Aq jX=A]

. The rm thus prefers debt issuance over asset sales if and only if
(1  p)P + p(Cq +Aq + F )
(1  p)P + pE[Cq +Aq + F jX = D] 
Aq(1 + k)
E[AqjX = A]
or equivalently
Dq
E[DjX = D] 
Aq(1 + k)
E[AjX = A]
In the core model, H had a stronger incentive to deviate from an asset-pooling equi-
librium to equity issuance if and only if F  F . Here, H has a stronger incentive to
deviate from an asset-pooling equilibrium to debt issuance if and only if DHDL 
AH
AL
, or more
explicitly
(1  p)P + p (CH +AH + F )
(1  p)P + p (CL +AL + F ) 
AH
AL
: (15)
Inequality (15) is the analog of (2) in the core model, and highlights how the intuition
for the balance sheet e¤ect is the same. The amount of funds raised, F , only a¤ects the
information asymmetry of debt (the LHS) and not of non-core assets (the RHS) as only
debt, and not assets, are a claim to the rms entire balance sheet. Thus, if F is su¢ ciently
high, the LHS falls below 1 and the inequality holds: the information asymmetry of debt
becomes su¢ ciently low that H has the strongest incentive to deviate from an asset-pooling
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equilibrium.24 Indeed, (15) yields:
F  F D  p (F  + E[C +AjX = D]) (< F ) :
This inequality must not hold for the o¤-equilibrium belief, that a deviator is of type L,
to be satised. Formally, an asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if F  F D (to satisfy
D1) and 1 + k < E[A]AL (as in the core model), and a debt-pooling equilibrium is sustainable
if F  F D (to satisfy D1) and 1 + k > DLE[D] = 1  pF (E[C +A]  (CL +AL)).25
Note that the above result, that debt is preferred for high nancing needs and assets are
preferred for low nancing needs, assumes that a rm has used up its risk-free capacity and
that EH < F , to rule out the trivial case of risk-free debt. If we relax these assumptions
and allow for risk-free debt then, as is well-known, this is the preferred claim. Then, debt
is preferred for very low nancing needs (that are su¢ ciently low for debt to be risk-free),
assets for moderate nancing needs, and debt again for high nancing needs (due to the
balance sheet e¤ect).
A semi-separating equilibrium can be sustained with cuto¤s dened analogously to the
core model,
Aq(1 + k

q )
E[AjX = A] =
Dq
E[DqjX = D] :
From this we can further derive the same properties as the core models semi-separating
equilibrium with F D in place of F : kH > k

L if and only if
DH
DL
> AHAL , i.e. F < F
D. The
price reaction to asset sales is positive (negative) if kH > (<)k

L, and from this we can show
that kH > (<)0 if and only if F < (>)F
D.
We now demonstrate the robustness of the camouage e¤ect to allowing for debt is-
suance. As in Section 2, we give rms the option not to raise nancing, and funds raised
nance a new investment with expected return rq > 0. The results are analogous to Propo-
sitions 3 and 4. The pooling and semi-separating equilibria considered above continue to
hold if 1 + rH  DHDL , because then all H-rms prefer raising nancing to inaction. The
camouage e¤ect is the analog of Proposition 4, part (iia). If DHDL > 1 + rH >
AH
AL
(1 + k),
then H-rms with k > kH forgo nancing. They have no synergy motives to sell assets, as k
is su¢ ciently high, and no investment motives to issue debt, because rH is su¢ ciently low.
Thus, debt is only issued by L-rms (with k > kL); it o¤ers no camouage and is valued
24Note that there is a second e¤ect of F in (15) which is absent in (2) and reinforces the balance sheet
e¤ect. When F rises, the amount that must be promised to debtholders P also rises. Since this is received
in solvency regardless of rm quality, it is the same in the numerator and denominator and also reduces the
LHS towards 1.
25One technical complication compared to the core model is that F D includes a conditional expectation
that incorporates investor beliefs, so it will take on di¤erent values in di¤erent equilibria. In a debt-pooling
equilibrium, the expectation evaluates to E[C+A], while in the asset-pooling equilibrium it evaluates to the
strictly-smaller CL + AL. This means there is a gap between the sustainability regions of the two pooling
equilibria, although a semi-separating equilibrium is still sustainable in this range if synergies are su¢ ciently
strong.
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at the lowest possible price of DL. However, H-rms with su¢ ciently strong dissynergies
(k < kH , where k

H > k) still sell assets. They thus o¤er camouage and are valued at a
pooled price of E[AjX = A] > AL. The threshold kL is thus dened by AL(1+k

L)
E[AjX=A] = 1, which
yields kL > 0. As in Proposition 4, part (iia), L-rms exhibit a strict preference for asset
sales. Even those with mildly positive synergies will sell assets, despite the loss of synergies,
since doing so allows them to camouage with H-rms.
We nally demonstrate the robustness of the correlation e¤ect of Proposition 2 by turn-
ing to the negative correlation model. Type (L; k) has the strongest incentive to issue debt,
and so under an asset-pooling equilibrium, a deviator to debt is inferred as this type. Under
this o¤-equilibrium belief, an asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if !  !APE , where
!APE is as in Proposition 2. On the other hand, a debt-pooling equilibrium is never sus-
tainable, for the same reason that an equity-pooling equilibrium was unsustainable in the
core model. Type (H; k) has the strongest incentive to deviate to asset sales, so D1 requires
an asset seller to be inferred as this type. Under this inference, (H; k) will indeed deviate
to asset sales. Thus, the correlation e¤ect continues to hold.
C Negative Correlation, Additional Equilibria
C.1 Separating Equilibrium
No separating equilibrium was possible in the positive correlation model of Section 1.1. This
subsection demonstrates that a separating equilibrium can hold in the negative correlation
model of Section 1.2, if stock price concerns ! are su¢ ciently weak.
The equilibrium entails H selling assets and L issuing equity. Both types are fully
revealed, so both fundamental value and the stock price, and thus the rms objective
function, equal Cq +Aq. If type H deviates to equity issuance, its payo¤ is
!(CL +AL) + (1  !)

CH +AH + F   F

CH +AH + F
CL +AL + F

which is less than CH +AH because CH +AH > CL +AL.
If type L deviates to asset sales, its payo¤ is
!(CH +AH) + (1  !)

CL +AL + F   F

AL
AH

which is weakly less than CL +AL if:
! 
F

AL
AH
  1

CH   CL +AH  AL + F

AL
AH
  1
 :
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Intuitively, if L deviates to asset sales, it su¤ers a capital loss on high-quality assets,
but enjoys a stock price gain from being inferred as H. Thus, stock price concerns must be
su¢ ciently low to deter deviation.
The equilibrium is formally stated in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. (Negative correlation, separating equilibrium). A separating equilibrium is
sustainable in which type H sells assets and type L issues equity if !  F

AL
AH
 1

CH CL+AH AL+F

AL
AH
 1
 .
C.2 Pooling Equilibria, General Model
This section shows that Proposition 2, the main result of Section 1.2, continues to hold
in the general model which gives rms the choice of whether to raise capital, allows the
capital raised to nance a positive-NPV investment, and introduces synergies. We impose
two natural technical conditions that prevent synergies and investment returns, respectively,
from dominating the other forces in the model. The rst is given by
E [k] <

F
(EH   EL) : (16)
Condition (16) ensures that, if a deviating rm is revealed as being low quality, it su¤ers a
lower stock price. While this might seem automatic, deviation could technically increase the
stock price if expected synergies are so large that, by deviating to equity sales, the markets
expectation of saved synergies exceeds the inferred fall in rm quality and so gives the
rm a higher stock price. A su¢ cient condition is E[k] = 0, i.e. symmetrically-distributed
synergies. In other words, (16) ensures that the asymmetry between positive and negative
synergies is not so great as to swamp all other forces in the model and mean that a rm
can increase its stock price by revealing itself as low-quality.
The second technical condition is given by
rL < rH +
(AL  AH)(1 + k)
E[A]
: (17)
Intuitively, the presence of investment returns r discourages both H and L to deviate to
inaction. If rL is much greater than rH , H could have the stronger incentive to deviate to
inaction, even though L su¤ers the larger capital loss by pooling. Condition (17) ensures
that this is not the case, so that asymmetry in investment returns does not swamp the other
forces in the model. A su¢ cient condition is rL  rH , i.e. high-quality rms do not have
lower-quality investment opportunities.
Our rst result is that equity-pooling is never sustainable. D1 requires any deviator to
be inferred as (H; k): since EH > EL, this type makes the biggest capital loss by pooling on
equity, and also has the strongest synergy motive to sell assets. Given this inference, (H; k)
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will deviate to asset sales. By doing so, he sells assets for a fair value instead of issuing equity
at a capital loss, and his stock price increases from E[C+A+Fr] to CH+AH+F (rH k).26
Our second result is that an asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if ! is su¢ ciently
high. D1 requires any deviator to be inferred as (L; k), since its assets have the high-
est common-value and private-value components, and so it has the strongest incentive to
deviate. Given this inference, (L; k) would enjoy a fundamental gain by deviating, so the
equilibrium requires both that deviation lowers the rms stock price (E[C+A+F (r k)] >
CL+AL+FrL, which holds due to condition (16)) and the stock price motive incentives !
to be su¢ ciently high. This requires
! 
F

AL(1+k)
E[A]   1

((CH   CL)  (AL  AH)) + F  E[r   k] + F

AL(1+k)
E[A]   (1 + rL)
 (18)
As in Proposition 2, asset-pooling requires ! to be su¢ ciently high so that the stock
price decline deters (L; k) from deviating from high-quality assets to low-quality equity.
Finally, we must show that neither type chooses to deviate to inaction. D1 requires
any deviator to be inferred as quality L (given condition (17) and synergy k (since it has
greatest incentive to retain its assets).27 Given this inference, (L; k) will deviate unless
! 
F

AL(1+k)
E[A]   (1 + rL)

((CH   CL)  (AL  AH)) + F  E[r   k] + F

AL(1+k)
E[A]   (1 + rL)
 : (19)
Since rL  0, this is a looser bound than in (18) and so can be ignored.
These results are summarized in Proposition 6, the analog of Proposition 2:
Proposition 6. (Negative correlation, pooling equilibria, voluntary capital raising.) Assume
conditions (16) and (17). An equity-pooling equilibrium is never sustainable. An asset-
pooling equilibrium is sustainable if and only if
! 
F

AL(1+k)
E[A]   1

((CH   CL)  (AL  AH)) + F  E[r   k] + F

AL(1+k)
E[A]   (1 + rL)
 : (20)
In this equilibrium, all rms sell assets for E [A] = AH + (1   )AL. If equity is sold
(o¤-equilibrium), it is inferred as type L and valued at EL. The stock prices of asset sellers
and equity issuers are E [C +A+ F (r   k)] and CL +AL + FrL, respectively.
26Recall that k < 0  rH . In addition, di¤ering from Section 1.2, the stock price here incorporates both
expected investment returns and, in the case of asset sales, expected synergy losses.
27Note that there was no need to deal with o¤-equilibrium beliefs about a rm deviating to inaction in
Section 2.1, because ! = 0 meant that inactive rms were unconcerned with the stock markets inferences
from inaction.
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D Selling the Core Asset
D.1 Positive Correlation
This subsection extends the core positive correlation model of Section 1.1 to allow the rm
to sell the core asset (in addition to the non-core asset and equity). Proposition 7 below
characterizes which equilibria are sustainable and when.
Proposition 7. (Positive correlation, selling the core asset.) Consider a pooling equilibrium
where all rms sell non-core assets (X = A) and a rm that sells equity or the core asset is
inferred as L. The prices of core assets, non-core assets, and equity are CL, AH+(1 )AL,
and CL +AL + F , respectively. This equilibrium is sustainable if:
F  F   CHAL   CLAH
AH  AL and (21)
AH
AL
 CH
CL
: (22)
Consider a pooling equilibrium where all rms sell core assets (X = C) and a rm that sells
equity or the non-core asset is inferred as L. The prices of core assets, non-core assets,
and equity are CH + (1   )CL, AL, and CL + AL + F , respectively. This equilibrium is
sustainable if:
F  F C  CLAH   CHAL
CH   CL and (23)
AH
AL
 CH
CL
: (24)
Consider a pooling equilibrium where all rms sell equity (X = E) and a rm that sells
either asset is inferred as L. The prices of core assets, non-core assets, and equity are CL,
AL, and  (CH +AH)+(1 ) (CL +AL)+F , respectively. This equilibrium is sustainable
if:
F  F   CHAL   CLAH
AH  AL and (25)
F  F C  CLAH   CHAL
CH   CL : (26)
For the asset-pooling equilibrium, condition (21) is the same as condition (ib) in Propo-
sition 1 of the core model: it ensures that the only admissible o¤-equilibrium belief under D1
is that an equity issuer is of quality L. Equation (22) is new and similarly ensures that the
belief that a core asset seller is of quality L satises D1. Thus, the asset-pooling equilibrium
can only be sustained if non-core assets have less information asymmetry than core assets,
as is intuitive. For the core-asset-pooling equilibrium, equations (23) and (24) similarly
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guarantee that the o¤-equilibrium belief that a seller of the non-core asset or equity is of
quality L satises D1. To understand the intuition, note that F 7 F  can be rewritten as
AH
AL
7 EHEL , while F 7 F
C can similarly be rewritten CHCL 7
EH
EL
.
The main result of Proposition 7 is to show that an equity-pooling equilibrium is still
sustainable. Condition (25) is the same as condition (iib) of Proposition 1 in the core model:
it means that the o¤-equilibrium belief that a seller of the non-core asset is of quality L
satises D1. Equation (26) is new and guarantees that the belief that a core-asset seller is
of quality L also satises D1. If both inequalities are satised, equity issuance is sustainable
even though it does not exhibit the least information asymmetry (absent the balance sheet
e¤ect). One of the assets (core or non-core) will exhibit more information asymmetry than
the other; since equity is a mix of both assets, its information asymmetry will lie in between.
Even though equity is never the safest claim, it may still be issued if F is su¢ ciently large,
due to the balance sheet e¤ect.
D.2 Negative Correlation
We now move to the negative correlation case. Proposition 8 characterizes the pooling
equilibria.
Proposition 8. (Negative correlation, selling the core asset.) The only sustainable pooling
equilibrium is one in which all rms sell non-core assets (X = A) and a rm that sells equity
or the core asset is inferred as L. The prices of core assets, non-core assets, and equity are
CL, AH + (1  )AL, and CL +AL + F , respectively. This equilibrium is sustainable if:
! 
F

AL
E[A]   1

((CH   CL)  (AL  AH)) + F

AL
E[A]   1
 : (27)
An equity-pooling equilibrium is not sustainable by the same logic as in the main text.
The same intuition rules out a core-asset-pooling equilibrium since, like equity, the core
asset is positively correlated with rm quality. In either equilibrium, the only o¤-equilibrium
belief consistent with D1 is that a deviator to non-core assets is of quality H. Under this
belief, H will indeed deviate to non-core assets. Thus, even if the core asset exhibits less
information asymmetry than the non-core asset, and so MM would suggest that it is more
likely to be sold, a core-asset-pooling equilibrium cannot exist due to the correlation e¤ect.
Equation (27) is the condition for L not to deviate to equity, and is the same as equation
(3) in the core model. If L deviates to the core asset, his objective function is also CL+AL
and so we have the same condition. This is intuitive: regardless of whether it deviates to the
core asset or equity, its claim is fairly priced as it is revealed as L. The o¤-equilibrium belief
that a seller of the core asset or equity is of quality L is trivially consistent with D1: For
either claim, L has a stronger incentive than H to issue it regardless of the o¤-equilibrium
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belief, because it will retain valuable non-core assets while selling less-valuable core assets
or equity.
The semi-separating equilibria are very similar to the core model. There is a semi-
separating equilibrium where H sells non-core assets and L issues equity, and also a semi-
separating equilibrium where H sells non-core assets and L sells core assets, under exactly
the same conditions as in the core model. In both equilibria, by deviating, Ls stock price
increases but his fundamental value falls by F (AL AH)AH . Regardless of whether L sells equity
or core assets in the semi-separating equilibrium, deviation involves him selling his highly-
valued non-core assets and thus su¤ering a loss. In both cases, the o¤-equilibrium belief
that a deviator to the o¤-equilibrium claim is of quality L is consistent with D1, because
L has strictly stronger incentives than H to do so. There is no semi-separating equilibrium
where H sells core assets and L sells equity, or when H sells equity or L sells the core asset,
since L will mimic H in both cases.
E Financing from Multiple Sources
The core model assumes that rms can only raise nancing from a single source. One
potential justication is that the transactions costs from using multiple sources of nancing
are prohibitive. This section instead allows rms to choose a combination of nancing
sources, and shows that the equilibria of the core model continue to hold if a rm choosing
multiple sources is inferred as L; we further show that this o¤-equilibrium belief is consistent
with D1.
We start with positive correlation. The action space now consists of a fraction  2 [0; 1]
of nancing that is raised from the pooling claim, which is no longer restricted to be 0
or 1. The o¤-equilibrium belief consists of a potentially di¤erent value  for each choice
of . We use X to denote the valuation of claim X applying the belief , i.e. X =
XH +(1 )XL. To sustain the pooling equilibria of the core model, we specify  = 0
for all  2 (0; 1), i.e. any rm using both sources is believed to be type-L. We show that
this o¤-equilibrium belief is consistent with D1 and that the pooling equilibria of the core
model continue to hold under this o¤-equilibrium belief.
To do so, we consider the incentive of a type q to deviate to an action  2 (0; 1). Given
the resulting o¤-equilibrium belief, the type deviates if the unit cost of nancing is lower,


c(X; q)
X

+ (1  )
 
c( ~X; q)
~X
!
<
c(X; q)
E[X]
Dividing both sides by c(X; q), and invoking from Proposition 1 the condition F < F 
for the asset-pooling equilibrium and F > F  for the equity-pooling equilibrium, we see
that this deviation is most likely for type L, and so D1 requires  = 0 for any  6= 1. This
45
is su¢ cient to verify the sustainability of the equilibrium: Type q will not deviate, given
the above o¤-equilibrium belief, if


c(X; q)
XL

+ (1  )
 
c( ~X; q)
~XL
!
>
c(X; q)
E[X]
:
We have c(X;q)E[X] <
c(X;q)
XL
, and the conditions in Proposition 1 (to guarantee incentive
compatibility) yield c(X;q)E[X] <
c( ~X;q)
~XL
. Thus, the linear combination of these inequalities
continues to hold.
Moving to negative correlation, the equity-pooling equilibrium continues to be unsus-
tainable by the same logic as in Proposition 2, since we have expanded the action space
compared to the core model. Turning to the asset-pooling equilibrium, type q deviates to a
given  if
!

(   )((CH   CL)  (AL  AH))

> (1  !)F


Aq
A
+ (1  )Eq
E
  Aq
E[A]

We rst show that  = 0 is consistent with D1 for any , although we can no longer
prove that this is the only belief consistent with D1. We seek a belief  under which L
has the strongest incentive to deviate. If  = 0, the inequality simplies to
Eq
E[E] <
Aq
E[A] ,
which does not depend on . Under this belief, type L has at least as strong an incentive
to deviate as any other type, so this belief is consistent with D1.
F Correlation E¤ect With General Correlation
While the core model allows for perfect positive correlation (AH > AL) and perfect negative
correlation (AH < AL), this section considers a generalization that allows for any degree
of correlation between the core and non-core assets. It shows that the correlation e¤ect of
Section 1.2 does not require perfect negative correlation; indeed, it can continue to hold
even if the correlation is positive.
In this generalized model, let CH > CL and AH > AL throughout, where we assume
CH +AL > CL+AH so that a high-quality rm has a higher total asset value. Let  be the
probability that core assets are of quality H and   Pr (AH jCH) = Pr (ALjCL) denote the
correlation between the values of the core and non-core assets. Thus, (C;A) = (CH ; AH)
with probability (w.p.) , (CH ; AL) w.p.  (1  ), (CL; AH) w.p. (1  ) (1  ), and
(CL; AL) w.p. (1  ) . The perfect positive (negative) correlation model of Section 1.1
(1.2) corresponds to  = 1 ( = 0), i.e. high-quality core assets always coincide with
high-quality (low-quality) non-core assets. (Indeed, in Section 1.2, we relabeled AH and
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AL to emphasize this point.) When  = 12 we have Pr (AH jCH) = Pr (AH jCL), i.e. zero
correlation. Thus,  > (<) 12 corresponds to general, i.e. not necessarily perfect, positive
(negative) correlation.
Proposition 9 is the analogy of Proposition 2 in the core model. It states that, when the
correlation  is below a cuto¤  (which may be strictly greater than 12), an equity-pooling
equilibrium is not sustainable for any ! but an asset-pooling equilibrium may be sustainable
for su¢ ciently high !. Proposition 2 was a special case of this result with  = 0.
Proposition 9. (Correlation e¤ect, general correlation.) An equity-pooling equilibrium is
not sustainable if and only if
 <  
( 
1 
2 1

(CH CL) (AH AL)
AH AL

if  > 12 ;
1 if   12 ;
(28)
An asset-pooling equilibrium is sustainable if and only if
!  !APE 
F

AH
E[A]   1

E[C +A]  (CL +AH) + F

AH
E[A]   1
 > 0: (29)
In this equilibrium, all rms sell assets for E [A] = [ + (1   )(1   )]AH + [(1   ) +
(1  )]AL and are priced at E [C +A]. If equity is sold (o¤-equilibrium), it is inferred as
stemming from (CL; AH) and valued at CL +AH .
We rst discuss the asset-pooling equilibrium, and start by addressing o¤-equilibrium
beliefs. Given an arbitrary o¤-equilibrium belief ( ~C; ~A), a type (C;A) deviates to equity if
and only if C+A+F~C+ ~A+F  
A
E[A] < , where  

!
1 !
  
1
F
 
~C + ~A  E[C +A]

is independent
of rm type. The inequality is most easily satised for C = CL, so D1 requires that a
deviator be inferred as having this value. D1 does not uniquely pin down a valuation for A
with general !, but to be consistent with the ! = 0 model, we set ~A = AH .
Given this o¤-equilibrium belief, consider the incentives of (CL; AH), the type most
likely to deviate. Deviating to equity issuance allows it to break even, compared to a
capital loss from pooling on asset sales), while causing the stock price to fall from E [C +A]
to CL+AH . Thus, the stock price decline outweighs the fundamental value gain, sustaining
the asset-pooling equilibrium, if and only if stock price concerns are high enough to satisfy
(29).
The intuition is as in the core model of Section 1.2: Regardless of the correlation between
the core and non-core assets , the equity sold is perfectly positively correlated with the
rest of the rm, and so deviation leads to a low stock price for both. Indeed, when  = 0,
the bound !APE simplies to the same value as in Proposition 2 of that section (in which
AH and AL were relabeled).
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We now turn to the equity-pooling equilibrium, and again start by addressing o¤-
equilibrium beliefs. Given an arbitrary o¤-equilibrium belief ( ~C; ~A), a type (C;A) deviates
to asset sales if and only if A~A  
C+A+F
E[C+A]+F < 
0, where 0 

!
1 !
  
1
F
 
~C + ~A  E[C +A]

is independent of type. D1 immediately requires ~C = CH , but does not uniquely pin down
~A. To be consistent with the ! = 0 model, we set ~A = AL.
Now consider the incentive of type (CH ; AL) to deviate to asset sales. If  < , then
CH+AL > E[C+A], so both the stock price and fundamental value are higher for (CH ; AL)
if he deviates to asset sales. This means the equilibrium is never sustainable, regardless of !.
If   , then CH+AL < E[C+A]. In this case, both the stock price and the fundamental
value are higher for (CH ; AL) by cooperating with equity issuance than by deviating, so the
equilibrium is always sustainable, again regardless of !.
For relatively low , deviation leads to negative inferences about the quality of non-core
assets. This is because the type most likely to deviate has low-quality non-core assets (thus
wishing to sell assets) and high-quality core assets (thus not wishing to sell equity). Even if
the correlation between core and non-core assets is not perfectly negative, deviation leads to
negatively-correlated inferences on the values of core and non-core assets. Indeed,  > 12 if
and only if  < 1  12

AH AL
CH CL

. The correlation could be positive and yet the correlation
e¤ect still holds, again because deviation leads to negatively-correlated inferences.
While  does not a¤ect the inference on the deviating rm, its role is instead to a¤ect the
pooled stock price (and thus whether deviating improves or worsens the inference on the rest
of the rm compared to pooling) and pooled values of assets and equity (and thus whether
deviating improves or worsens the capital gain compared to pooling). When  is low, type
(CH ; AH) is rare it is unlikely that both core and non-core assets are high-quality. Thus,
the pooled stock price E [C +A], which incorporates the possibility that the rm is of type
(CH ; AH), is lower.28 In this case, deviation improves both the stock price and fundamental
value, and so the equity-pooling equilibrium is unsustainable. For the same reason, low
 means that CH + AL > E[C + A] and so type (CH ; AL) was making a strictly positive
fundamental loss of CH+AL+FE[C+A]+F   1 under equity issuance, thus giving it fundamental value
motives to deviate.
A similar e¤ect can occur for the asset-pooling equilibrium. If  < 12 and  is su¢ ciently
small, we could have E[C + A] < CL + AH . In this case (CL; AH) would enjoy a higher
stock price and higher fundamental value from deviating to equity issuance, and so asset
pooling never be sustainable.29 However, E[C +A] < CL+AH is a stronger condition than
E[C + A] < CH + AL (since CL + AH < CH + AL). Thus, the values of (; ) for which
28 (CL; AL) also becomes rarer if  falls, but the e¤ect of this on the pooled stock price is smaller if   12 ,
as CL is rarer than CH to begin with. If on the other hand  < 12 , then E [C +A] < CH + AL and so it is
automatic that, regardless of , (CH ; AL) enjoys an increase in both fundamental value and the stock price
from deviation and so an equity-pooling equilibrium is unsustainable.
29This is already accounted for in the statement of Proposition 9, as the value of !APE exceeds 1 in this
case.
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equity-pooling is sustainable is a strict subset of those for which asset-pooling is sustainable.
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